ATTACK ON USS STARK

On 22 September 1980, years of animosity between Iran and Iraq erupted into a shooting war.  Early in that conflict Iranian jets destroyed Iraq’s only Persian Gulf oil terminal, greatly hindering the flow of this strategic resource.  (Saddam Hussein would not forget how easily his limited coastal access had been denied–a vulnerability that influenced his annexation of Kuwait in 1990).  Iraq countered with attacks against merchantmen, largely tankers, from Iran.  By 1984 both sides were actively attempting to choke off oil leaving, or war supplies bound for, the other.  In what was to become known as the “Tanker War,” by 1986 neutral Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian ships were falling victim to mines and missile attacks at a rate of about two a week.

In March 1987 Kuwait approached the United States with a plan to re-flag eleven Kuwait Oil Company supertankers as American and have them proceed under escort of US warships.  President Reagan reacted favorably, and while plans were finalized several American warships took up station in the Persian Gulf.  One of these was the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigate HAROLD R. STARK (FFG-31).  While standing radar picket duty 80 miles northeast of Bahrain, STARK received warning at 2000 hours from a circling E-2 Hawkeye of an Iraqi F-1 Mirage in the area.  At 2058, STARK acquired the Mirage on its air-search radar at a range of 70 miles.  At 2105 the Mirage turned toward the frigate and launched a French-made Exocet anti-ship missile at a range of 22.5 miles.  A second followed less than a minute later.  Both incoming missiles were spotted by lookouts on the STARK, but chaff rockets and the Phalanx CIWS gun could not be armed in time.

The first missile entered the port side and penetrated passageways, computer spaces, and berthing before coming to rest without detonating on the 2^nd deck.  Along its course it deposited 360# of burning fuel.  The second struck 25 seconds later, eight feet forward of the first.  Its warhead detonated on impact, starting a 3000^o fire intense enough to melt the frigate’s aluminum superstructure.  Despite the fire and a 16^o list, LT Art Conklin’s damage control parties were able to keep the warship afloat.  Thirty-seven crewmen were lost, and the medical department’s efforts were complicated by polyester fabric from the Certified Navy Twill (CNT) uniforms melted into many of the burns.

Within 24 hours STARK was under tow to Bahrain for repairs.  The Iraqi government apologized, stating the Mirage had mistaken STARK for a tanker.  On July 21^st the first convoy of re-flagged tankers left Khawr Fakkan, United Arab Emirates, under escort of FOX (CG-33), CROMMELIN (FFG-37), and KIDD (DDG-993) for Kuwait.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  22 MAY 23

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Howarth, Stephen.  To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy  1775-1991.  New York, NY: Random House, 1991, p. 549.

Levinson, Jeffrey L. and Randy I. Edwards.  Missile Inbound:  The Attack on the STARK in the Persian Gulf.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1997.

Love, Robert W.  History of the US Navy, Vol 2  1942-1991. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, pp. 771-79.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1991, pp. 283-86.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  ADM Harold Rainsford Stark (1880-1972) was a WWI veteran and our Chief of Naval Operations throughout World War II, from 1939-49.

     The STARK experience was a factor in removing CNT uniform fabric from use at sea, in favor of all-cotton “shipboard” khaki.

The post Attack on USS STARK appeared first on Today in Naval History.

                   THE “UNITED STATES FLEET”

Since the Revolution, our national security interests had concentrated on the Atlantic Ocean, and our Navy operated the majority of her warships in those waters.  Only a handful of frigates or cruisers patrolled such far-flung locations as the Pacific, the Mediterranean, or the West African coast.  The Atlantic-based operations of subsequent conflicts, such as the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I, reinforced our Atlantic orientation.  By the decade of the 1920s, 180 of our Navy’s finest ships, including 16 battleships, were in the Atlantic Fleet.  The titular Pacific Fleet was squadron-sized at best, with vessels nearing the end of their service life.

But Japan’s post-WWI mandate over Germany’s former Pacific island possessions, indeed their militarization of these islands, spurred US planners to consider a threat from that direction.  The opening of the Panama Canal eight years earlier facilitated rapid movement between the two oceans, and strategists decided to shift our naval defenses whence they could readily address what was then conceived to be our most credible threat.  On this day, CNO ADM Robert Coontz merged the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets into the “United States Fleet,” and the bulk of our warships were moved to bases along our Pacific coast.  The single fleet mentality prevailed–only a small cruiser/destroyer training squadron remained in the Atlantic.

At the time, our major west coast facilities were in San Francisco and Puget Sound, but neither was robust enough to service the entire US Fleet.  San Pedro, near Los Angeles, offered a harbor deep enough for battleships, while San Diego’s shallow, curving channel could accommodate destroyers and gunboats.  This latter harbor, by virtue of its position as the first American port north of Panama, received immediate improvements and would eventually grow to its modern size.  San Pedro persisted as a base for battleships into the 1990s; the last Pacific battleships in active service during Vietnam and Desert Storm were homeported at nearby Long Beach.

But Germany’s aggressions in the late 1930s forced American planners to consider simultaneous threats from two directions.  On 17 June 1940, CNO ADM Harold R. Stark introduced the (then) novel concept of a “Two-Ocean Navy” to Congress, and a month later President Franklin Roosevelt signed a $4 billion Naval Expansion Act into law.  On 1 February 1941, the Pacific-based United States Fleet was re-divided into separate Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, this time of more equitable strength.  This dual fleet orientation is that which we take for granted in the 21^st century.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  13 DEC 22

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Baer, George W.  One Hundred Years of Sea Power:  The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990.  Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1996, p. 106.

Love, Robert W.  History of the US Navy, Vol 1  1775-1941.  Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, 524-26, 541-43.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, pp. 133, 142, 143, 146, 149.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Despite this re-division of the fleets on 1 February 1941, the “United States Fleet” continued as an administrative umbrella overseeing both arms.  ADM Ernest J. King was the last independent CINCUSFLEET, appointed on 20 December 1941 after Pearl Harbor.  Then on 12 March 1942, the duties of CNO and CINCUSFLEET were combined under ADM King.

The Naval Expansion Act of 1940 also expanded the 1^st and 2^nd Marine Brigades into the modern 1^st and 2^nd MarDiv’s, headquartered in Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, respectively.

Though in hindsight one might criticize the single fleet mentality, it had one under-appreciated benefit.  The shifting of the single fleet from coast to coast required robust basing facilities on both coasts.  As a result, the infrastructure necessary to support the dual fleet re-organization, and indeed the “Two-Ocean War,” was already in place in 1941.

The post The “United States Fleet” appeared first on Today in Naval History.