USS PATAPSCO

The Rebel-controlled guns of Forts Sumter, Moultrie, and Johnson straddling the entrance to Charleston harbor anchored the Confederate defenses in the late Civil War.  The mouth of the harbor and the entrance channel were obstructed with log booms, pilings, and “torpedoes” (underwater mines).  The Civil War saw the first effective use of fixed underwater mines, and Union warships off Charleston had learned a healthy respect for torpedoes.  Working parties in rowboats regularly dragged the approaches to Charleston with grappling hooks to find and remove these “infernal devices.”  Because these parties worked within range of Confederates on Morris and Sullivan’s Islands, a Union gunboat was usually detailed to provide cover.  Such was the ironclad monitor PATAPSCO’s duty after sunset this evening.

As the rowboats worked 100-200 yards off her beams, PATAPSCO occupied the channel, drifting seaward with the ebbing tide, then steaming back up to the Lehigh buoy.  Her commanding officer, LCDR Stephen P. Quackenbush, and about 40 sailors were out on the monitor’s deck, directing the boats sweeping for torpedoes.  The XO, LT William T. Sampson, conned the monitor from atop the rotating turret.  This night there was no pestering fire from the shore and three times, PATAPSCO drifted lazily down the channel with the tide.  Three times she turned and steamed back up.  But as she made her third return about 2010 hours, a sudden, sharp explosion rocked her port bow.  The cloud of steam and a geyser of seawater immediately alerted Sampson that he had struck a torpedo.  He had no time to react.  Within 15 seconds the forward deck flooded, and in another 30 seconds the monitor rested on the bottom of the 50-foot-deep channel.  Curiously, Sampson only got his feet wet, for when all motion stopped the top of the turret was only ankle-deep.  He simply stepped into the rescuing launch.  Quackenbush and 42 sailors on deck were fished from the water, but the crewmen below decks were not so lucky.  Civil War monitors did not have escape hatches.  To protect against boarders, such ships were built with only one or two hatches leading below deck.  As a result, only two sailors from below were able to scramble to safety.  Sixty-four men, including the Assistant Surgeon Samuel H. Peltz, the surgeon’s steward; the sick nurse; most of the engineers, firemen, and coal heavers; the paymaster; and all the cooks were trapped and died.

Visitors to modern Fort Moultrie National Historical Park on Sullivan’s Island will notice an obelisk commemorating the Union sailors lost with PATAPSCO.  In fact, the monitor still lies today where she sank on this date, having since been partially salvaged, then blasted flat to clear the channel.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  21 JAN 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Civil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1961, p. V-16.

“Report of Lieutenant-Commander Quackenbush, U.S. Navy, commanding U.S.S. PATAPSCO” dtd. 16 January 1865.  IN:  Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol 16, South Atlantic Blockading Squadron from October 1, 1864, to August 8, 1865.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1903, pp. 175-76.

“Report of Lieutenant Sampson, U.S. Navy, executive officer of the U.S.S. PATAPSCO” dtd. 16 January 1865.  IN:  Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol 16, South Atlantic Blockading Squadron from October 1, 1864, to August 8, 1865.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1903, pp. 176-78.

“Report of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, U.S. Navy,” dtd. 16 January 1865.  IN:  Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol 16, South Atlantic Blockading Squadron from October 1, 1864, to August 8, 1865.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1903, pp. 171-75.

“Report of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, U.S. Navy, transmitting report of proceedings of a court of enquiry,” dtd. 29 January 1865.  IN:  Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, Series I, Vol 16, South Atlantic Blockading Squadron from October 1, 1864, to August 8, 1865.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1903, pp. 178-80.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, p. 81.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  This sinking marked the fourth loss of a monitor during the war, the second to torpedoes.  It prompted both tactical and strategic changes to the Union’s campaign against Charleston.  From this date, only tugboats and launches were used to protect sweepers clearing Charleston’s channels, and the strategy for the joint Army/Navy assault on Charleston was altered.  The point of attack was shifted northward, away from Charleston Harbor, to the less protected waters of Bull’s Bay about 10 miles up the coast.

PATAPSCO’s executive officer, William T. Sampson, is of course better remembered for his action as the senior in command of US Navy forces off Santiago, Cuba, three decades later in the Spanish-American War.  He is one of several Navy veterans of the Civil War who remained on Active Duty to fight in that latter conflict.

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                   SAMPSON-SCHLEY CONTROVERSY

The naval battle of Santiago on 3 July 1898 had been a pivotal victory in the Spanish-American war, despite some initial miscues.  The overall commander, Acting RADM William T. Sampson, had gone ashore hours before the battle to confer with Army commanders.  On-scene command fell to CAPT Winfield S. Schley in the cruiser BROOKLYN (ACR-3), who, when he observed the lead Spanish warship emerging from the harbor, ordered an inscrutable turn to port, away from the enemy cruiser.  BROOKLYN completed a 270^o loop to finally reach the proper heading, and in doing so crossed the path of the battleship TEXAS, who was forced to back all her engines.  Sampson heard the gunfire from ashore and returned in the cruiser NEW YORK (ACR-2) only to find he had missed most of the action.

Newspaper columns of the day sang the praises of CAPT Schley, to whom the lion’s share of the credit for the victory was given.  Out of respect for his commanding officer, Schley prepared a telegram laying credit for the victory at the feet of Sampson.  Sampson happily forwarded Schley’s telegram to SECNAV but appended it with a secret letter criticizing Schley’s dilatory conduct a month earlier in establishing the initial blockade of Santiago.  This secret letter came to light a few months later as Congress was considering the promotions of Schley, Sampson, and George Dewey to the permanent grade of RADM.  Schley was outraged, and his strong letter of protest sidelined plans to advance Sampson several slots above Schley on the seniority list.

The issue rested for two years until the respected historian Edgar Maclay published volume III of A History of the United States Navy, a text then in use at the Naval Academy.  In it, Maclay roundly criticized Schley’s actions before and during the battle, hinting even at Schley’s cowardice.  Again, Schley was outraged and requested a special Board of Inquiry into his conduct at the battle.  Secretary of the Navy John D. Long reluctantly convened the Board, which deliberated over 40 days.  Their majority opinion, released this day, sided with Sampson (though Board president RADM George Dewey authored the minority opinion supporting Schley).  This only incensed Schley the further, who appealed directly to President Theodore Roosevelt.

By now, the squabbling between otherwise respected naval officers had embarrassed the Navy substantially.  And after reviewing the entire case, Roosevelt approved the findings of the majority.  Schley continued his protestations until a frustrated Roosevelt arbitrarily declared the case closed.  The controversy split the senior Navy leadership between pro- and anti-Schley factions, a rift that remained until WWI intervened.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  20 DEC 22

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Beach, Edward L.  The United States Navy:  200 Years.  New York, NY: Henry Holt Co., 1986, pp. 362-65.

Langley, Harold D.  “Winfield S. Schley and Santiago:  A New Look at an Old Controversy.”  IN: James C. Bradford.  Crucible of Empire:  The Spanish American War & its Aftermath.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1993, pp. 69-98.

Maclay, Edgar Stanton.  A History of the United States Navy:  From 1775 to 1901, Vol III.  New York, NY: D. Appleton and Co., 1901, pp. 363-66.

Potter, E.B.  Sea Power: A Naval History, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1981, p. 185.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1991, p. 116.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The Sampson-Schley controversy ranks with Tailhook as one of the greatest public image debacles in our Navy’s history.  The squabbling over an essentially vainglorious issue–who deserved credit for the one-sided victory at Santiago–tarnished the image of the Naval officer in favor of that of the Army officer.  The pro-Schley lobby was led by the respected George Dewey with the anti-Schley side voiced by War College pillars Alfred T. Mahan and Stephen B. Luce.  Ironically, Edward Beach points out that in truth, neither Sampson nor Schley had planned for the unexpected daylight breakout of the Spanish.  Neither was Schley “in command” of the fleet that morning.  The record shows he gave commands only to his flagship BROOKLYN.  In reality, every ship captain present had acted on his own in tackling the obvious situation that presented.

As a result of the controversy, Maclay’s test was withdrawn from the curriculum at the Naval Academy.  Few copies of volume III were printed and even fewer survive today.

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