FT. FISHER FALLS (cont. from Dec 25)

After MGEN Benjamin Butler’s Christmas assault was rebuffed, RADM David Dixon Porter returned off Fort Fisher on the 12^th of January.  Two lessons had been learned in the failed attempt–the naval bombardment would have to be more effective, and the land assault would have to be more aggressive.  Even GEN Ulysses Grant recognized the importance of closing the last Confederate port and this time sent a new Army commander, MGEN Alfred J. Terry, with 12,000 troops and a siege train.

This morning, Porter moved the ironclad NEW IRONSIDES and four monitors to within 700 yards of the fort.  The gunners had orders to avoid random shots or vain attempts to carry away the flagpole, rather they were to dismantle the fort’s guns.  This time their work was effective, and by afternoon Terry was landing troops out of range onto the river shore.  To be sure, in these days the Army enjoyed primacy as a US military force, the Navy often being envisioned simply as a supporting force.  Porter probably knew that if Terry took the fort the Army would get sole credit for the victory.  Against this possibility Porter issued General Order 81 which instructed 1600 bluejackets and 400 Marines from Porter’s ships to take the fort by assaulting up the sloping sea face:

“The sailors will be armed with cutlasses, well sharpened, and with revolvers…When the signal is made to assault, the boats will pull around the stern of the monitors and land right abreast of them, and board the fort on the run in a seaman-like way.”

Late in the afternoon of the 15^th, 2000 sea-servicemen, who had never before fought as a unit, landed on the sea face under the command of LCDR Kidder R. Breese.  Unfortunately, the inclined wall turned out to be nearly vertical, ringed at its base by a breakwater of rocks.  There was little cover, and the Confederates rained down a hailstorm of canister and rifle fire.  Three unsuccessful charges cut the bluejackets to pieces, 350 of the landing party were killed or wounded.  Unable to advance or withdraw, they hunkered behind rocks through the cold night.  Exposure and sniping claimed more.  Thought this primary assault failed, the brave action at the foot of the wall diverted Confederate attention, allowing Terry to breach two gun traverses in the northwest corner before being discovered.  The fort fell.

The subsequent surrender of Wilmington validated GEN Lee’s dire prediction.  His defense of Richmond was fatally starved of supplies, and the Confederacy fell within four months.

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CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Rehabilitation Medicine

Anderson, Bern.  By Sea and by River:  The Naval History of the Civil War.  New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962, pp. 276-84.

Fowler, William M., Jr.  Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil War.  New York, NY: Avon Books, 1990, pp. 263, 266-72.

Gragg, Rod.  Confederate Goliath:  The Battle of Fort Fisher.  Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1991.

Page, Dave.  Ships Versus Shore:  Civil War Engagements along Southern Shores and Rivers.  Nashville, TN: Rutledge Hill Press, 1994, pp. 82-102.

Reed, Michael and John T. Kuehn.  “Triumph of Civil War ‘Jointness.'”  Naval History, Vol 27 (6), December 2013, pp. 32-39.

Robinson, Charles M.  Hurricane of Fire:  The Union Assault on Fort Fisher.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1998.

Site visit, Fort Fisher State Park, Kure City, North Carolina, 8 December 2001.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Historians agree that one of David Dixon Porter’s shortcomings was his strong desire to achieve personal glory in battle, even at the cost of sailors’ lives.  Above is one example often cited from the Civil War.

Our WWI destroyer USS BREESE (DD-122) remembers LCDR Breese above.  David Dixon Porter and his father David Porter are remembered with five warships; TB-6, DD-59, DD-356, DD-800, and DDG-78.

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                                            FT. FISHER FAILURE

Several factors made Wilmington, North Carolina, a valuable entry port for blockade running.  Wilmington was equidistant from the main smuggling bases in Nassau and Bermuda, with good rail connections inland.  Positioned 28 miles up the Cape Fear River, she was out of range of deep-water Union guns.  Entrance from the Atlantic could be afforded by either of two channels, and Union patrols had difficulty covering both.  In addition, the northern channel, New Inlet, was guarded by the 75 guns of the massive earthen-walled Fort Fisher.  Wilmington had been transformed by blockade running.  As the rest of the South crumbled toward the end of the war, the steady supply of life’s finery and the affluence of a high profit industry were a cultural boon to the Cape Fear region.  As well, success attracted the undesirable speculators, gamblers, and riff-raff.  Both Lee and Grant appreciated what Wilmington represented to the South’s war effort.  Thus, in late 1864, the capture of Wilmington became a priority for the new commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, RADM David Dixon Porter.

Porter’s first obstacle, Fort Fisher, was probably the Confederacy’s most impregnable fortification.  Located athwart a narrow spit of land running due south into the mouth of the Cape Fear River, laborers had worked unheeded for four years to perfect the works and extensive bombproofs.  The saw-toothed palisade was formidable, but in particular, the loose, sandy earth of the walls and floors swallowed cannonballs without damage.  Porter’s 55-ship Union Navy flotilla, the largest ever assembled to that day, arrived off Ft. Fisher on December 20^th.

Porter’s first attempt on the 23^rd was a bombship.  The sidewheel steamer LOUISIANA was laden with 350 tons of gunpowder and towed near the fort.  Her detonation that evening was impressive, but alas, ineffective.  Porter then rained upon Ft. Fisher an intensive two-day bombardment, at times reaching a rate of fire of 115 rounds per minute.  Assigned to Porter were 6500 Union Army troops under the dubiously capable MGEN Benjamin F. Butler, who had previously bungled an attack on Richmond.  On Christmas Day, 3000 of Butler’s troops were landed north of the fort for an assault.  But these troops were surprised to observe that Ft. Fisher had withstood two days of intensive bombardment with little visible damage.  Confederate commander COL William Lamb had lost fewer men than had been claimed by accidental explosions on the attacking Union ships!  He was able to man the palisade in force against the assault, pinning down Butler’s men through the day.  Unable to land more troops because of souring weather, Butler reembarked the stranded landing force.  Porter was furious, but his ships had exhausted their ammunition in the pre-Christmas bombardment, and he was forced to re-group.

Continued 15 JAN 2025…

Anderson, Bern.  By Sea and by River:  The Naval History of the Civil War.  New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962, pp. 276-84.

Fowler, William M., Jr.  Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil War.  New York, NY: Avon Books, 1990, pp. 263, 266-72.

Gragg, Rod.  Confederate Goliath:  The Battle of Fort Fisher.  Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1991.

Page, Dave.  Ships Versus Shore:  Civil War Engagements along Southern Shores and Rivers.  Nashville, TN: Rutledge Hill Press, 1994, pp. 82-102.

Reed, Michael and John T. Kuehn.  “Triumph of Civil War ‘Jointness.'”  Naval History, Vol 27 (6), December 2013, pp. 32-39.

Robinson, Charles M.  Hurricane of Fire:  The Union Assault on Fort Fisher.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1998.

Site visit, Fort Fisher State Park, Kure City, North Carolina, 8 December 2001.

The post Ft. Fisher Failure appeared first on Today in Naval History.