THE BLOCKADE OF FLORIDA

Seminole Indians, angered over President Andrew Jackson’s plan for their relocation to the Oklahoma Indian Territory, rose up on 28 December 1835 and attacked a column of Army troops under MAJ Francis L. Dade south of Tampa, Florida.  Only three of Dade’s 110 men escaped the massacre.  The Second Seminole War was thus ignited, the only Indian war in which our Navy played a significant role.

Whether or not arms and ammunition were being run to the Seminoles by the Spanish from Cuba, as Floridian officials continuously insisted, is arguable.  But on this day, in response to Florida Governor John H. Eaton’s persistence, Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson ordered a blockade of the southern coast of Florida.  The job fell to the West Indies Squadron, but Commodore Alexander J. Dallas had only five ships as his disposal–the venerable 38-gun frigate CONSTELLATION, the sloops-of-war ST. LOUIS, 20, WARREN, 20, and VANDALIA, 18, and the schooner GRAMPUS, 12. 

To our 1830s Navy, maritime blockade was an unknown mission.  Since her foundational years our Navy had served only two missions: the Federalist task of guerre de course by lone-ranging independent ships; and the Jeffersonian reservation of the Navy for harbor and inshore defense.  The frame of mind necessary to manage an offensive blockade didn’t exist among Naval officers, Commodore Dallas in particular.  In this Seminole War there were no enemy cruisers to attack, merchantmen to intercept, or fleets to engage.  Dallas’ strategic orientation did not suit the tasking.  Furthermore, possessed of only deep draft warships, blue-water cruising was his only viable course–and gun running to Florida could have been more easily done with shallow-draft skiffs and barges working up through the Keys.  As a result, this blockade of Florida wasn’t our most shining accomplishment.

Dallas also found his attentions distracted by competing priorities.  New England merchants were ranting over losses to Haitian pirates.  Texas was striking for independence from Mexico, and the simultaneous Creek War in Georgia demanded Marine Corps support.  But most damning, our Navy never believed that arms were being run to the Seminoles in the first place.  Dallas would find it impossible to prioritize a mission he judged unnecessary from the outset.

Not surprisingly, no filibustering captures were made off Florida during the 1836-42 blockade, though it was maintained continuously throughout the Seminole uprising.  Our greatest contribution to the conflict turned out to be a “mosquito fleet” of shallow-draft riverine craft that took the fight to the enemy in Florida’s wetlands.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  26 JAN 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Buker, George E.  Swamp Sailors:  Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835-1842.  Gainesville, FL: Univ. Presses of Florida, 1975, pp. 1-5, 34-35, 47-48.  Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 2 “C-F”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, p. 171.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, p. 130.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 6 “R-S”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1976, p. 244.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 8 “W-Z”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, p. 107.

Mahon, John K.  History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842.  Gainesville, FL: Univ. of Florida Press, 1985, pp. 121, 171, 220.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, p. 40.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The Second Seminole War is an example of how not to run a joint operation.  Throughout the conflict the Army continued to believe the Indians were being supplied from Cuba and could not fathom why the Navy didn’t prevent such.  The Navy thought the opposite, and until the advent of the “mosquito fleet” in 1840, there was very little coordination between Army and Navy operations.

ST. LOUIS was to have an exceptionally long career for a wooden sloop.  She was built by the Navy, for the Navy, at the Washington Navy Yard in 1828 and initially served as the flagship for Dallas’ West Indies Squadron.  She was transferred to the Pacific Squadron in 1839.  After showing our American flag for the first time in San Francisco Bay, she transferred to Singapore with our East Indies Squadron.  Again a flagship, she was re-assigned to the Mediterranean Squadron in 1852.  She served twice with the African Squadron, suppressing slave trading in the pre-Civil War years, then patrolled with the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during that latter momentous conflict.  From 1866-94 she was laid up at Philadelphia as a receiving ship and training ship for the Pennsylvania Naval Militia.  In 1894 she was formally loaned to the state Militia and in 1904 her name was changed to USS KEYSTONE STATE in deference to that organization.  She was finally stricken from the Naval Vessels Register on 6 August 1906 and sold for scrap.  Her 78-year career, marked by multiple re-fits, spanned four wars and allowed the training of countless naval personnel.

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