THE TRUE BLUE SALOON

Frictions between the President of Chile, José Manuel Balmaceda, and the Chilean Congress erupted into civil war in January 1890.  US sympathies leaned weakly toward Balmaceda, but in the main, President Benjamin Harrison was most interested in preventing European powers (particularly England) from exploiting the struggle for their own gains.  Toward this end, Harrison dispatched the protected cruisers CHARLESTON (C-2), BALTIMORE (C-3), and SAN FRANCISCO (C-5) to patrol the Chilean coast.  The insurgents won the initial battles, forcing the weakened Balmaceda government to seek refuge in the American consulate in Valparaiso.  The consulate then became such an object of local anger that on 28 August 1891 a guard of Marines under CAPT William S. Muse had to be landed.  Then in October of 1891, the incumbent government collapsed after Balmaceda committed suicide.  Tensions momentarily eased in the city, and CDR Winfield Scott Schley, whose cruiser BALTIMORE had been standing in the harbor for months, seized the opportunity to send his thirsty sailors on liberty.

In retrospect, Schley’s decision was regrettable as mobs of victorious insurgents with long memories still roamed Valparaiso’s streets.  Neither did Schley organize the customary precaution of a shore patrol.  Nevertheless, on the night of 16 October a liberty party from the BALTIMORE located a likely watering-hole called the True Blue Saloon.  In short order they were hunted down by an anti-American mob who still recalled the US support of their deposed former president.  A brawl ensued in which local police “looked the other way” as Boatswain’s Mate C.W. Riggins and another sailor were beaten to death and sixteen others injured.  The Chilean foreign minister complicated matters with some disparaging remarks about the incident, prompting President Harrison to demand reparations and an official apology.  The new Chilean president, Jorge Montt, was oblivious to US concerns and ignored the request.

In the ensuing months, anti-Chilean factions in America pressed Harrison for a military solution.  By January the absence of any reply had piqued Harrison’s anger.  He ordered Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy to pre-position American warships, and on the 27^th of January requested a war declaration from Congress.  Impressed with the apparent American resolve, five days later the Montt government agreed to pay a $75,000 indemnity to the families of the two slain sailors.  A war with Chile had been narrowly averted.  (One factor that temporarily cooled the crisis was the surprised realization on the part of US planners that the Chilean Navy was materially stronger than our own, having purchased several British-built cruisers during Chile’s recent war with Peru). 

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CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Rehabilitation Medicine

Coletta, Paolo E.  American Secretaries of the Navy  Vol 1 1775-1913.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1980, p. 420.

Howarth, Stephen.  To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy  1775-1991.  New York, NY: Random House, 1991, p. 241.

Love, Robert W.  History of the US Navy, Vol 1  1775-1941.  Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, pp. 365-68.

Miller, Nathan.  The U.S. Navy:  An Illustrated History.  Annapolis, MD: American Heritage and USNI Press, 1977, p. 203.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1991, p. 100.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  This was not Winfield Scott Schley’s only questionable decision.  He later became embroiled in an embarrassing public controversy with RADM William Sampson, his senior at the Battle of Santiago on 3 July 1898.  Schley’s alleged cowardice and confusing ship movements during that battle became the point of argument between the officers, a shameful public fight that ultimately required the intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt.

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                 THE BALTIMORE INCIDENT (cont.)

As CAPT Isaac Philips approached Cuban waters a squadron of warships flying Spanish colors was sighted on the horizon.  They shifted to British colors and bore down on USS BALTIMORE, 20, and the nine merchant sail she escorted.  The British West Indies squadron regularly patrolled Cuban waters.  France and England were at war and Spain was allied to France.  The British reasoned that goods inbound to Cuba would likely end up in French hands and were attempting to intercept “contraband.”  The activity was also quite lucrative, as ships and cargo confiscated by the British could be sold for profit by the captains and crews.

HMS CARNATIC 74, in company with QUEEN, 98; THUNDERER, 74; MAIDSTONE, 32; and GREYHOUND, 32, fired a gun to leeward and requested to speak the American captain.  The convoy proceeded, and Philips–what papers he had in hand–was rowed to CARNATIC for a conference with British CAPT John Loring, an expatriate American Tory from the Revolutionary War days.  Loring’s first request was that the convoy be halted, which was reinforced by shots across the bows of three merchantmen.  Loring next announced his squadron was short of men, and informed Philips that his crew would be searched for any Englishmen.  Philips protested, then produced a copy of his original orders from the Secretary of the US Navy.  Loring’s response was flippant, “Who is Ben Stoddert?”  When Philips returned to BALTIMORE he found British 2^nd LT Wright mustering his crew.  Fifty-five American sailors were pulled from the ranks and rowed across to His Majesty’s vessels (fifty were returned a few hours later).  From BALTIMORE’s convoy Loring cut out the brig Norfolk as carrying contraband.  Philips was then allowed to proceed.

Word of the event was greeted in Washington with bipartisan outrage!  England and the United States were not at war, but the impressment of Americans seriously threatened that status quo.  British minister Robert Liston defended Loring on the technicality that Philips carried no commissioning papers and was therefore subject to the British blockade as would be any merchant vessel.  Loring had reported as much, though curiously his report enclosed a copy of a letter dated 17 November in which Loring referred to Philips as, “Captain Isaac Phillips American States Ship BALTIMORE.”  Philips’ own report confessed he had submitted to a foreign authority without a fight and had allowed the junior Lieutenant to muster his crew.  Stoddert was livid and summarily dismissed Philips by Secretarial caveat.  A court martial would have pulled three of the Navy’s few seasoned senior officers from more critical duties at sea.

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CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Rehabilitation Medicine

Cooper, James Fenimore.  History of the Navy of the United States of America, Vol. I.  Philadelphia, PA: Lea & Blanchard, 1840, pp. 250-59.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 1 “A-B”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1959, p. 88.

Love, Robert W.  History of the US Navy, Vol 1  1775-1941.  Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, pp. 63-64.

Maclay, Edgar Stanton.  A History of the United States Navy:  From 1775-1893, Vol I.  New York, NY: D. Appleton and Co., 1893, pp. 171-72.

Palmer, Michael A.  Stoddert’s War:  Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1987, pp. 59-67, 242-50.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Philips had been condemned by his self-incriminating report of the incident, in which he honestly related his improper submission to British authority.  However, Philips would not rest after this incident and repeatedly petitioned for reinstatement.  His last attempt came in 1825 and was accompanied by a revised second report of the incident that contradicted elements in his original report.  (Philips believed his original report had been destroyed when the Washington Navy Yard was burned in 1814).  He was unsuccessful, and a surviving copy of his original report re-surfaced in 1985, putting to rest any lingering doubt as to his culpability.  A copy of that report has been reprinted in Palmer’s book above.

This event engendered Anglophobic feelings throughout the US Navy and was one in a series of incidents in which American ships were stopped on the high seas and American sailors impressed into Royal Navy service.  Such abuse would eventually contribute to the War of 1812.

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                     THE BALTIMORE INCIDENT

For five months the US Navy had been patrolling, President John Adams having ordered the protection of American shipping from French privateers during a brush with that nation known today as the “Quasi-War.”  October found the 20-gun warship USS BALTIMORE accompanying the frigate CONSTELLATION, 36, north from Cuba escorting 43 merchant sails.  Off Florida, senior squadron officer CAPT Thomas Truxtun detached CAPT Isaac Philips in BALTIMORE to range ahead along the Georgia/Carolina coast.  In doing so Philips stumbled across the path of CAPT Samuel Nicholson in the frigate CONSTITUTION, 44.  Despite Philips’ standing orders from Truxtun, Nicholson ordered Philips into his squadron.  Thus, on 24 October 1798, BALTIMORE departed Charleston in company with CONSTITUTION escorting 11 merchant ships to Cuba.

Truxtun was furious that his force had been depleted of BALTIMORE–even more when he was advised Nicholson had sailed without orders.  True, Nicholson was senior to Truxtun on the Navy’s list of Captains, and shortly CONSTITUTION’s departure orders did arrive from Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert–directing CONSTITUTION to Boston for refitting.  Official records do not describe the motivation for Nicholson’s diversion south.  Perhaps the entreaties of local businessmen who sought protection for their ships softened the Captain’s heart.  More likely according to some historians, Nicholson had learned of a large sum of gold waiting in Havana for shipment north.  The transport of specie was a legitimate endeavor for a Navy frigate, especially considering the dangers upon the open ocean in that day.  The government rate was 1/2% on the first $10,000, and 1/4% on the remainder.  But it’s known that captains in that day often privately negotiated additional “carrying charges.”  It has been speculated that Nicholson stood to profit handsomely and took BALTIMORE along as insurance.

BALTIMORE had been constructed in 1795 as the merchant trader Adriana, but had been purchased and armed by Stoddert’s Navy Department in response to the quasi-war with France.  She had left Baltimore months earlier to meet CONSTELLATION–so hastily that her commissioning papers and Philips’ captaincy appointment were still hung-up in the mail from Washington.  She was 35 men short of a full crew, and only 12 aboard had any experience as seamen.

Philips’ voyage with Nicholson quickly went sour.  Four days out CONSTITUTION sprang her bowsprit and had to return to Charleston.  BALTIMORE was instructed to continue southward with nine merchantmen of the convoy–“shanghaied” from her standing orders, on a dubious mission, under an inexperienced crew, and unable to prove she was a commissioned vessel of the US Navy.  Perhaps Philips could have anticipated the disaster that awaited him this day, nineteen days hence.

Continued tomorrow…

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 1 “A-B”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1959, p. 88.

Palmer, Michael A.  Stoddert’s War:  Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1987, pp. 59-65.

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