CLOCKING THE SPEED OF LIGHT

Midshipman Albert A. Michelson excelled in science during his years at the Naval Academy.  In his 29-member graduating class of 1873 he was ranked ninth overall, first in the subject of optics and second in thermodynamics.  He ranked only 25th in seamanship however, neither did he excel on his obligatory Passed Midshipmen cruises the following year.  But Michelson’s academic genius did not go unrecognized for LCDR William T. Sampson, Head of the Department of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, brought ENS Michelson back to the Academy in December 1875 to teach physics and chemistry.

Over the subsequent years Michelson became interested in the vexing problem of measuring the speed of light, a controversial topic to physicists of that day.  Capitalizing on the work of French physicist Jean Bernard Leon Foucault, Michelson designed an apparatus to bounce a light beam between a rotating mirror and a stationary mirror 500 feet apart.  His crude setup, constructed mostly of spare parts scrounged from Academy labs, was substantially more precise than Foucault’s, and during the Summer of 1878 he improved on the accuracy of the Frenchman’s estimates.

Still not satisfied, in the Spring of 1879 he expanded his setup using a straight line of sight along a 2000-foot seawall at the Academy.  His rotating mirror was mounted at one end of the seawall near what was then the ferry pier (currently the entrance to MacDonough Hall) and a plane mirror was placed behind what is today Maury Hall.  Of necessity, Michelson also developed a novel method to accurately calibrate the speed of his rotating mirror with a tuning fork.  Using this more accurate setup Michelson clocked the speed of light at 186,355 miles/second.  This he dutifully reported to the Secretary of the Navy on this day in his letter, “Experimental Determination of the Velocity of Light.”  Still not satisfied, Michelson further refined his setup in the years that followed, mounting mirrors at Ft. Myers that shot beams of light across the Potomac River to the Naval Observatory and the Washington Monument.

Michelson resigned his commission in 1882 and in later years further expanded his reputation in the international scientific community.  His decades of hard work and intellectual brilliance were honored in 1907 with the awarding of the Nobel Prize for physics–the first American scientist to receive this award.  The seawall along which his famous experiments were conducted has since been demolished.  But today a marker on the plaza between Michelson Hall and Chauvenet Hall at the Academy identifies Michelson’s line of sight along the former seawall of 1879.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   4 OCT 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret. 

Jaffe, Bernard.  Michelson and the Speed of Light:  Biography of a Scientist.  Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1960, pp. 50-56.

Livingston, Dorothy Michelson.  The Master of Light:  A Biography of Albert A. Michelson.  New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973, pp. 35-66, 232-37.

McAllister, D.T.  Albert Abraham Michelson:  The Man Who Taught the World to Measure (Michelson Museum Pub. No. 3).  China Lake, CA: Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Station China Lake, May 1970.

Wilson, John H., Jr.  Albert A. Michelson:  America’s First Nobel Prize Physicist.  New York, NY: Julian Messmer, Inc., 1958, pp. 62-73.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Michelson’s apparatus projected light onto a plane mirror spinning at 128 rotations/second.  The light was reflected off this mirror along the seawall to strike the distant second mirror.  From here it was reflected directly back along the seawall to the original rotating mirror.  During the time it took the light to travel down the seawall and back, the first mirror had rotated a few degrees further, reflecting the returning light beam back to Michelson at a slight angle.  The measure of this angle and the known speed of the mirror’s rotation were used to calculate the time it took for the light to travel down and back along the 2000-foot seawall.  The accuracy of Michelson’s calculation of 186,355 +/- 31 miles/second has withstood the test of time and further experimentation.  Michelson’s Nobel Prize included the sum of 139,000 Swedish Crowns, approximately $40,000.

Though his first love was science, Michelson never lost his affinity for the Navy.  After resigning his commission in 1882 he continued for years in the Naval Reserve.  Between 21 June 1918 and 8 March 1919 Michelson voluntarily returned to active duty while America fought in WWI.  He was assigned to the Navy Bureau of Ordnance as a consultant working on the practical problems of gunnery range finding and on engineering a substitute for high-quality German optical glass.  Michelson moved to Pasadena, CA, in his later years, where he died in 1931.  Michelson Laboratory on the Naval Weapons Center China Lake is named in his honor, as is the oceanographic ship USNS MICHELSON (T-AGS-23).

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                                             LOSS OF POMPANO

On Thursday, September 30^th, 1943, the staff of COMSUBPAC in Pearl Harbor awaited the arrival of USS POMPANO (SS-181), completing her seventh war patrol.  She had last been seen five weeks earlier on 20 August, when LCDR Willis M. Thomas and his crew of 50 shoved off for a dangerous mission hunting down enemy shipping directly off the Japanese home islands of Honshu and Hokkaido.  PICKEREL (SS-177) had failed to return from the northern Honshu area in April.  RUNNER (SS-275) had been sent there later that summer but was overdue since 11 July.  POMPANO was to patrol until 27 September, then shape a course back to Hawaii for refit.  But nothing had been heard from her.  More days passed.  Weeks passed.  Then it became apparent that LCDR Willis and his crew would not be returning.

Commissioned several years before World War II erupted in Europe, the Porpoise-class SS-181 was a veteran of the Pacific war by this point.  Thomas had been her skipper since her third patrol, credited with sinking the seaplane tender SAGARA MARU, the picket boat NANSHIN MARU, along with several smaller ships, and damaging four others.  Destroyers were considered low-priority targets at this stage of the war as efforts concentrated on denying the island nation of shipping.  But on this cruise, POMPANO had attacked and missed two destroyers and even fired in a radar-guided night attack at a large blip thought to be a carrier.

It was not until Japanese naval records were recovered after the war that further information about POMPANO was learned.  These records showed that on September 1^st the 451-ton coaster Nankai Maru fell victim to a torpedo.  On September 3^rd, the 5600-ton transport Akama Maru was introduced to Davy Jones.  Nanking Maru was damaged in a 9 September attack but managed to limp away.  And the 2958-ton auxiliary Taiko Maru went down on this day, all in the area POMPANO was patrolling.  (Taiko Maru was later credited to USS WAHOO (SS-238)).  These same captured records showed no anti-submarine attacks by Imperial Japanese Navy vessels in the area at this time, although the presence of a newly laid minefield was revealed.

Today it is thought that POMPANO, and probably PICKEREL and RUNNER before her, fell victim to that minefield.  The exact circumstances are not known, perhaps they were positioning for submerged attacks, or perhaps transiting on the surface, but the mine explosions apparently happened so quickly and so violently that all hands on all three boats were lost.  In view of these losses COMSUBPAC RADM Charles A. Lockwood decided to give the area a temporary reprieve.  From the point of view of our submarine Navy PICKEREL, RUNNER, and POMPANO remain on patrol to this day.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  29 SEP 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Blair, Clay, Jr.  Silent Victory:  The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, Vol 1.  New York, NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975, p. 433.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 5 “N-Q”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1979, pp. 345-46.

Holmes, Harry.  The Last Patrol.  Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, Ltd., 1994, pp. 47-48, 55-58.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, p. 163.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  According to custom, the Pompano name was re-assigned to SS-491, laid down in July 1945.  But SS-491 was canceled on the ways when the war ended a month later.  LCDR Thomas was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.  His widow was honored on 5 March 1951 as the sponsor of USS BARRACUDA (SSK-1).

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                                             250^th ANNIVERSARY

                                       PROVIDENCE vs. MILFORD

On 10 May 1776, temporary CAPT John Paul Jones assumed command of the Continental Navy sloop PROVIDENCE, armed with twelve 4-pounders.  Jones received his permanent commission on 8 August and departed the Delaware Capes on the 21^st to cruise independently.  As small as was the sloop, and as lightly armed, her employment would be against British merchant shipping.  But when lookouts spotted a sail on the horizon this day, it turned out to be that of an enemy frigate.  British frigates routinely carried long 24-pounders, with twice the range and weight of broadside of Jones’ sloop.  A fight was out of the question, but gaming was not!

At that moment Jones’ crew was employed in fishing–a welcomed supplement to a diet of salt pork and hard tack.  But the appearance of the frigate sent all hands to quarters.  Jones stood his position as the frigate abandoned her escorted merchantman and turned in his direction.  Indeed, PROVIDENCE stood fast until the enemy had reached firing range.  Then Jones set a full press of sail and skirted off across the wind.

The Briton followed, firing at extreme range.  Jones cris-crossed in front of the frigate, first to windward, then to leeward.  The sprightly sloop literally danced on the waves compared to the more plodding frigate, who proved to be HMS MILFORD, 28.  All the while the frigate fired, hoping even at such extreme range that a lucky shot might reach the sloop.  For the next several hours Jones maneuvered.  Much to his delight the frigate expended round after round in an impotent bombardment that never touched the American.  Remaining just out of reach, Jones ducked in, around, and about the frigate, who lumbered in comparison and whose continued bombardment only ruffled the pitching swells.  For eight full hours, the rest of that day’s light, Jones baited the Briton into firing over 100 useless rounds.  So contemptuous was the British firing that when the frigate rounded to loose yet another fruitless broadside, Jones ordered the Lieutenant of this Marines, Edmund Arrowsmith, to fire a single musket in reply to what he called the British “salute!”

Nightfall ended the chase with the frigate having closed no further than during that afternoon.  The next morning found the enemy still in the area, but on a westward heading.  Jones further mused at how her captain would brag in Halifax as to the “sound thrashing” he gave the lucky rebel privateer!  PROVIDENCE raided Canso Harbor, Nova Scotia, the following day, where Jones commandeered an English fishing schooner and scuttled two smacks, but not before his crew had transferred all the fish to the sloop–their own fishing having been interrupted!

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   25 SEP 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 5 “N-Q”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1979, pp. 396-97.

Hannings, Bud.  Chronology of the American Revolution.  Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2008, pp. 130, 131.

letter of Captain John Paul Jones to the Continental Marine Committee, dtd. 30 September 1776.  IN: Morgan, William J.  Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Vol 6.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1972, pp. 1047-50.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  This cruise of PROVIDENCE was more eventful than simply the above.  Between 21 August and 20 September PROVIDENCE took three merchantmen, Britannia, Sea Nymph (shipping sugar and rum), and Favourite (bound for England with cargo of sugar).  Jones made another fleeting escape from HMS SOLEBAY, 28, on September 1^st.  CAPT Jones returned from Nova Scotia on 8 October and was promoted to command the 24-gun former merchant brig, now Continental Navy frigate, ALFRED.  (ALFRED is named for Alfred the Great (849-899) the Anglo-Saxon king who united various kingdoms of Brittania into a nation and developed an early foundation of what would become the Royal Navy.)

          PROVIDENCE continued to serve our Continental Navy until 14 August 1779 when she was trapped in the Penobscot River by a British squadron and scuttled by her crew to prevent her capture.

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                                                PREBLE’S BOYS

On this date, CDORE Edward A. Preble reached the Mediterranean in his flagship CONSTITUTION, 44, with PHILADELPHIA, 36; ARGUS, 16; SYREN, 16; ENTERPRISE, 12; NAUTILUS, 12; VIXEN, 12.  He assumed command of our Mediterranean Squadron and began efforts to stem piracy against merchant shipping by the Barbary States of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco.  Assigned to his squadron were over a dozen junior officers, none of whom was over the age of 30, sparking Preble to remark that he had been given, “nothing but a pack of boys.”

Preble’s single-minded aptitude for military life manifested staunch commitment and bold courage.  As a junior officer he had learned and expanded the ideas of his mentor CAPT Thomas Truxtun–concepts of discipline and dedication to duty that have become foundational to our modern core values of honor, courage, and commitment.  And Preble’s passion for service was tempered by genuine concern for his bluejackets and junior officers.  He shared responsibility with subordinates and encouraged free thought.  He generously credited the achievements of his charges and fought for promotions and honors for the deserving.  He fostered an aggressive spirit and held himself and his men to the highest standards of conduct and ethics.  The respect and admiration he engendered with his subordinates has been the subject of frequent mention.

Preble’s influence on his officers was profound, most remaining in US Naval service long after their tours under him. In fact, Preble’s metaphor stuck when fifteen of his Squadron officers proudly proclaimed themselves “Preble’s Boys.”   LT’s David Porter, Charles Stewart, Isaac Hull, Thomas MacDonough, Isaac Chauncey, James Lawrence, Stephen Decatur, Daniel Patterson, Lewis Warrington, and Johnston Blakely read like a who’s who of the later War of 1812.  Others, William Bainbridge, Stephen Cassin, James Biddle, Jacob Jones, and William Burrows have become embodiments of our naval heritage.  Indeed, of the 18 significant ship-to-ship victories of the later War of 1812, 17 were commanded by one of “Preble’s Boys.”  Since a 1950 publication by Fletcher Pratt (below), Preble’s development of junior officers has been lionized.

On the other hand, some historians have criticized the romanticization of “Preble’s Boys.”  Undoubtedly their sterling character and professional demeanor were influenced by Preble, as well as other officers under whom they served.  In that day our Navy was of a size that most senior officers of the War of 1812 would have unavoidably experienced earlier service under Preble.  And, it is argued, their success in 1812-15 was as much a consequence of their service longevity and the “right stuff” they naturally possessed.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   20 SEP 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Crawford, Mike.  “Preble’s Boys or Just the Right Stuff.”  DC Military Website, AT: http://ww2.dcmilitary.com/stories/102909/southpotomac_28123.shtml, retrieved 10 September 2012.

McKee, Christopher.  Edward Preble:  A Naval Biography 1761-1807.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1972.

Pratt, Fletcher.  Preble’s Boys:  Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power.  New York, NY: William Sloane Associates, 1950.

“Preble and “His Boys.”  AT: http://navyadministration.tpub.com/12966/css/12966_38.htm, retrieved 10 September 2012.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, p. 18.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Preble’s metaphor of “a pack of boys” may not be completely accurate.  Reliable sources quote his true utterance as “nothing but a parcel of children.” 

          CONSTITUTION (later nicknames “Old Ironsides”) was one of six frigates authorized by Congress in 1794 to give a measure of strength to our nascent Navy.  All six were named for elements of our novel, representative government, our first formal naming convention:  CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, CONSTELLATION (the stars on our ensign), and CHESAPEAKE (our largest and most important bay).  Prior to 1794 warships were named in a variety of patterns, such as for prominent men of our history (EFFINGHAM, WARREN, TRUMBULL, HANCOCK) or noxious insects (FLY, HORNET, WASP, MOSQUITO) to reflect their smalls size, but deadly sting.

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                                         OREGON FIREBOMBING

“All is ready, Sir,” reported Warrant Flying Officer Nubuo Fujita to his skipper, CDR Meiji Tagami, of the submarine I-25.

“Very well.  Good luck, Fujita.”

With that Fujita and his flight observer Petty Officer Shoji Okuda boarded their Type 96 “Geta” mono-wing, dual pontoon seaplane and strapped themselves snug for the catapult off the afterdeck of the submarine.  Once airborne they steered a course east, into the orange haze of the rising sun, toward the Cape Blanco lighthouse on the southern Oregon coast.

Japanese submarines had been operating off the western United States coastline since December 1941.  They had sunk American freighters within sight of land and had even shelled factories and forts along the California and Oregon coasts.  The advanced state of Japanese submarine technology, that allowed cruising ranges of 6000 miles or more, failed only in its absence of radar.  This limitation was addressed in the I-15-class with the inclusion of an airplane, stowed in 12 pieces in a hangar behind the conning tower.  In less than 20 minutes on the surface crewmen could assemble the plane then catapult it into the air to scout ahead of the sub.  But the light of this early dawn would see I-25’s plane used for more than just scouting.  Today Japan would strike the first blow behind the coast of the continental United States by a foreign enemy since the War of 1812.

Fujita crossed the coastline about 0600, where he was spotted but misidentified by a US coast watcher.  Under each wing he carried a 70 kg bomb, each packed with 512 incendiary pellets that would scatter across a 200-yard circle and burn at 2000^o.  It was Fujita’s intent to drop these bombs in a remote reach of the Oregon forest thereby starting a destructive fire that would wreak havoc throughout the American northwest.  Fujita dropped the first bomb 50 miles inland, flew 10 minutes further east, then dropped the second.  Both landed on Wheeler Ridge in the Siskiyou National Forest, and in both cases, Fujita saw the orange glow of the scattering incendiaries.  He dove to treetop level and turned for the coast.  He re-crossed the coastline about 0630, where he was again spotted and again misidentified.  On his way back to the sub he spotted two American freighters crawling northward against the Humbolt Current.

Though the intended conflagration did not occur, back aboard I-25 Fujita’s success was greeted with the cheers of sailors proud to have avenged Doolittle’s raid of six months earlier.  Tagami sped after the two freighters but aborted the chase when an American patrol plane spotted the sub and forced her under. 

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  13 SEP 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Orita, Zenji with Joseph D. Harrington.  I-Boat Captain.  Canoga Park, CA: Major Books, 1976, pp. 113-16.

Webber, Bert.  Silent Siege-III:  Japanese Attacks on North America in World War II–Ships Sunk Air Raids Bombs Dropped Civilians Killed.  Medford, OR: Webb Research Group, 1992, pp. 131-40, 217-25.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Fujita’s bomb did not even require the efforts of Oregon firefighters to extinguish.  Having unintentionally chosen the rain-soaked month of September, all his incendiaries simply smoldered out.  Fujita and I-25 made an identical second bombing run, also on Oregon, twenty days later with equally ineffective results.

Nubuo Fujita survived the war and returned to Oregon several times.  Indeed, a friendly, welcoming relationship developed over the years between he and the city of Brookings, Oregon.  Fujita had been particularly interested in developing the youth of both Japan and America.  He arranged for several Brookings high school students to take an exchange semester in Japan, and he contributed toward the purchase of children’s books by the Brookings public library.  On 9 September 1992, the 50^th anniversary of his bombing, the 80-year-old Fujita hiked to the spot of the above bombing and planted a redwood tree in a private ceremony promoting continued peace between his country and the United States.  Fujita passed away 30 September 1997 at age 85.

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5 SEPTEMBER 1776

THE FRIGATE TRUMBULL

With the sentiment of independence from Britain growing, the 1^st Continental Congress in 1775 addressed the issue of seapower.  Were we to declare independence (July the following year) we would need a naval force to counter the vaunted Royal Navy.  Initially, on 13 October 1775, Congress voted to purchase several existing merchant ships and re-fit them for wartime cruising.  The next naval appropriation came two months later, on 13 December 1775, this time an authorization for keel-up construction of dedicated warships.  Thirteen frigates were to be built in shipyards throughout the colonies; Connecticut was to construct a 28-gun frigate to be named TRUMBULL.  Jonathan Ttumbull was the Colonial Governor of Connecticut at the time, and unlike most colonial governors, his sympathies lay with the patriots.  More importantly, he had been using his successful business connections to help finance our soon-to-be-declared nation.

Work on TRUMBULL progressed quickly after her keel was laid in early Spring 1776 at Chatham on the Connecticut River.  At 700 tons she was holed for twenty-four 12-pounders and six 6-pounders.  TRUMBULL slid off the ways this day, but to the surprise of all, her draft proved too great to clear the bar at the mouth of the Connecticut River!  Temporarily stymied, her builders tied her to the wharf while our independence was declared and the Revolutionary War began.

Events conspired further against the frigate.  In April 1777 the commander of British forces in North America, GEN William Howe, ordered New York’s colonial governor MGEN William Tryon, to conduct a raid into the Connecticut countryside, from which support for the patriots was known to be coming.  TRUMBULL’s builders feared the defenseless frigate would have to be destroyed to prevent her capture.  Indeed, Tryon’s force landed at Fairfield and marched inland to burn a patriot arsenal in Danbury, Connecticut.  A small band of minutemen harassed the British, but instead of turning in the direction of Chatham, Tryon’s men marched back to their ships.  Pure luck left TRUMBULL undisturbed in her berth.

Vexed still with getting the frigate over the bar, TRUMBULL sat in Chatham for two more years.  Then in 1779 Continental Navy CAPT Elisha Hinman came up with a novel suggestion.  Casks of water were lashed to the frigate’s hull yoked by stout ropes stretching beam to beam under her keel.  The casks were then pumped dry and the resulting buoyancy lifted the frigate just enough to clear the bar at high tide.  In September 1779 Congress appointed CAPT James Nicholson as her skipper, and finally, by May 1780 she put to sea for her first cruise.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   9 SEP 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Connecticut Courant, 2 September 1776.  IN: Morgan, William James.  Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Vol 6.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1972, p. 654.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 7 “T-V”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, p. 309.

Ward, Christopher.  The War of the Revolution, Vol 2.  New York, NY: MacMillan Co., 1952, pp. 492-503.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  TRUMBULL would fight two notable engagements, the first a victory over the British privateer Watt, and the second her defeat and capture by HMS IRIS, 32.  This was the second of three ships to be named for Jonathan TRUMBULL, the third being an 18-gun sloop commissioned during the Quasi-War with France.

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                                              30-31 AUGUST 1776

                                  EVACUATION OF LONG ISLAND

Boston, the hotbed of colonial rebellion, became the British Army’s North American headquarters in the mid-1770s.  But after GEN George Washington emplaced cannon in the Dorchester Heights overlooking that city in March 1776, British MGEN William Howe quit Boston in favor of New York.  Washington followed overland, crossing to the woodlands and farms of Long Island.  Here he set up defenses across the East River from New York city proper, then occupying only the southern end of Manhattan Island.  Howe set up his base of operations on New York Harbor’s sparsely populated Staten Island, from whence he launched his 32,000-strong army against Washington on 22 August.  Quietly, the bulk of the British forces out-flanked Washington’s positions, while the Royal Navy attempted to enter and hold the East River.  This maneuver would trap Washington in a pincers action.  But contrary winds held British warships out of the East River, while Washington’s 10,000-man army regrouped and dug in at the Brooklyn Heights, at the site of the East River ferry landing.  Howe was wary of the carnage suffered in assaulting fortified positions at Bunker Hill and chose this time to besiege the Americans.  And while sappers dug trenches around the Brooklyn Heights on August 28^th, Washington recognized escape across the East River and north up Manhattan Island was his only option.

But evacuating under Howe’s nose, in front of the British Navy, would be difficult.  Washington turned to COL John Glover’s 14^th and COL Israel Hutchinson’s 27^th Continental Infantry Regiments.  Both units were comprised of fishermen and sailors from Massachusetts.  Under utmost secrecy these seasoned mariners commandeered every available boat in the area.  Even Washington’s soldiers were kept in the dark, being told only to be ready to march on the 30^th as they would be relieved by reserve troops.

At 2200 this night, the evacuation began.  Campfires were left burning in the Brooklyn Heights as Glover’s men loaded soldiers, horses, cannon, and supplies into Durham flat-bottomed ore boats.  Working throughout the short summer night, the Massachusetts mariners made crossing after crossing of the one-mile-wide river.  To complicate matters, headwinds prevented employment of several sailing sloops.  Nervous eyes scanned the horizon for the first hint of dawn while Glover’s tars struggled on.  Thousands of men and tons of equipment had been moved by daybreak.  But the rising sun caught the operation unfinished!  Miraculously, a heavy morning fog shielded Glover’s boats from British eyes for several more hours, and the last of Washington’s army was whisked to safety.  Not a boat or a man was lost, and Washington’s army lived to fight another day.

Watch for a related story 18 October…

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Billias, George Athan.  General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners.  New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, p. 110.

Griffith, Samuel B., III.  The War for American Independence.  Urbanna, IL: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2002, pp. 301-07.

Langguth, A.J.  Patriots: The Men who Started the American Revolution.  New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1988, pp. 378-85.

Middlekauff, Robert.  The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789.  New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005, pp. 345-53.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, pp. 2-3.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  British pickets were shocked to find the American lines abandoned on the morning of the 31^st.  Washington had escaped with his army intact, preventing a reverse that would likely have ended the rebellion on the spot.  Later this same year Glover would reprise this remarkable night amphibious feat, ferrying Washington’s army across the Delaware River on Christmas night before the victory at Trenton.  BGEN John Glover is remembered today with the Cold War research destroyer GLOVER (AGDE-1).  Israel Hutchinson has not yet been remembered with a warship, the WWII patrol frigate Hutchinson (PF-45) recognizes a city in central Kansas.

William Howe was the youngest of three brothers and was well acquainted with British military activities in North America.  His father, Emmanuel Howe, had been governor of Barbados, and his oldest brother, George, was killed during our French and Indian War while serving as a General Officer in the British Army.  William’s second brother, Admiral Richard “Black Dick” Howe, commanded British naval forces in the colonies during our Revolution.

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                                               HATTERAS INLET

Union MGEN Benjamin F. Butler, commanding Fort Monroe but not renowned for his tactical genius, nevertheless cleared Rebels from the Newport News region of Virginia during the spring of 1861.  This effort was defeated at the battle of Big Bethel on June 10^th.  Hoping to redeem himself after learning that the Confederate defenses of North Carolina’s Outer Banks were weak, Butler wrote to Washington suggesting he head an operation there.  His letters arrived just after the demoralizing Union defeat at Bull Run, and when maritime insurance rates were soaring as a result of Confederate privateers operating from Cape Hatteras and Ocracoke.

On the morning of August 27^th, a Union Navy flotilla commanded by CAPT Silas Stringham arrived off Hatteras Island with Butler’s 900-man 9^th and 20^th New York regiments embarked.  Around 1000 the frigates USS MINNESOTA, WABASH, CUMBERLAND and the gunboats MONTICELLO, HARRIET LANE and PAWNEE opened with their combined 149 guns.  COL William F. Martin’s 350 Confederate defenders hunkered inside Fort Clark, one of two earthen fortifications guarding each side of the entrance to Hatteras Inlet.  Steam powered warships were a novelty for our Navy in warfare, and instead of anchoring his fleet for the bombardment Stringham cleverly steamed them in a circle, firing in rotation.  As such they were more difficult targets for Confederate artillerists, who scored few hits.  Butler’s troops began landing at noon north of the Inlet.  Rough surf allowed only 318 of the 20^th New York to be landed–exhausted, powder soggy, and short of food and water.  But by now Stringham’s ships had largely reduced Fort Clark, and at 1230, Martin’s Confederates withdrew across the Inlet to Fort Hatteras.  The 20^th New York straggled into Fort Clark and raised the American flag, the first of the war over a Confederate fort.

Rebel reinforcements numbering 230 arrived that night from Ocracoke under Confederate Navy Commodore Samuel Barron.  Had their leader known the sorry state of the 20^th New York, his superior numbers might have retaken Fort Clark with little effort.  At dawn Stringham’s flotilla turned its attention to Fort Hatteras.  The onslaught was remarkable, over 3000 shot and shells rained onto the fort–as many at 28/minute.  At 1100 a shell threaded one of the ventilation ducts and started a fire that looked threatening.  The Confederates had had enough.  At 1107 they raised a white flag.

Though Butler’s troops did little except occupy forts cleared by naval gunnery, he received the laurels for the victory.  The Confederate positions at Ocracoke and Oregon Inlet were soon abandoned, and coastal North Carolina was opened to the Union.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   30 AUG 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Anderson, Bern.  By Sea and by River:  The Naval History of the Civil War.  New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962, pp. 48-52.

Fowler, William M., Jr.  Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil War.  New York, NY: Avon Books, 1990, pp. 61-65.

Jones, Virgil Carrington.  The Civil War at Sea, Vol 1  The Blockaders.  New York, NY:  Holt Rinehart Winston, 1960, pp. 192-209.

Miller, Edward Stokes.  Civil War Sea Battles:  Seafights and Shipwrecks in the War Between the States.  Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, Inc., 1995, pp. 57-66.

Page, Dave.  Ships Versus Shore:  Civil War Engagements along Southern Shores and Rivers.  Nashville, TN: Rutledge Hill Press, 1994′ pp. 59-63.

Trotter, William R.  Ironclads and Columbiads:  The Civil War in North Carolina, The Coast.  Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair Pub., 1989, pp. 25-41.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Hatteras Inlet separates Hatteras and Ocracoke Islands.  Storms have erased all traces of Forts Clark and Hatteras today, but the land upon which they stood is now part of Cape Hatteras National Seashore.

Coming at a time of Union Army missteps and the humiliating defeat at Bull Run, this victory boosted the Unionist cause.  However, the strategic importance of Hatteras has been appreciated more by historians than by leaders at the time.  Had Lincoln exploited this victory, and the subsequent conquest of Roanoke Island, he could have taken eastern North Carolina and the key railhead at Goldsboro.  Lee’s Army of Virginia would have been cut off from supply, the South would have effectively been divided.   

Instead, the Northern strategy during the initial months of the Civil War was essentially that of the earlier Mexican War.  The North anticipated and sought a Napoleonic-style conflict employing major land forces, culminating in the capture of the enemy’s capital city (Richmond).  Mexico and the Confederacy shared the commonality of having large land masses, miles of remote coastline, and inland capital cities.

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                                      HAKE, HARDER, AND HADDO

CDR Samuel D. Dealey commanded a three-sub “wolfpack” off the Philippines comprised of his boat, HARDER (SS-257), along with HADDO (SS-255) and HAKE (SS-256).  US planners were anticipating the invasion of those islands in October, and our submarines were there ahead of D-Day to reconnoiter and clear out enemy shipping.  For Dealey it was his sixth war patrol, having received the Medal of Honor for his fifth patrol.  But plethoric combat had taken its toll on his psyche.  Shipmates noted him to be troubled, at times having difficulty making decisions.  A letter Dealey had written several days before this patrol was rambling, in places incoherent, with handwriting that was barely legible.  COMSUBSOPAC Commander RADM Ralph W. Christie, had already determined this would be Dealey’s last cruise.  Dealey’s XO, LCDR Frank C. “Tiny” Lynch, thought him unqualified even for this last cruise, noting that at times Dealey seemed dangerously cavalier about enemy anti-submarine measures.

The three subs met off the western coast of Luzon on August 22^nd where CDR Chester W. Nimitz, Jr., spotted an enemy destroyer.  But before he could attack, the destroyer detected him and charged.  Nimitz was forced to fire four torpedoes “down the throat,” all of which missed.  HADDO dove and dodged the inevitable depth charge barrage.  At sunrise Nimitz spotted another destroyer, ASAKAZE, escorting a tanker.  This time his torpedoes struck the tin can, blowing off her bow and settling her bridge section into the water.  Two trawlers were noted to depart the shore, presumably to tow the stricken destroyer into Dasol Bay near the Lingayen Gulf.  HADDO was now out of torpedoes and Nimitz turned away for our Indonesian base at Mios Woendi, in Biak.

HAKE and HARDER picked up the battle, rendezvousing off Dasol Bay.  When HAKE heard screws at 0554 this morning both skippers assumed that the stricken ASAKAZE was being towed south to Manila.  Unknown to them, ASAKAZE had sunk the day before, and the noises HAKE heard were the aging Thai destroyer PHRA RUANG now in Japanese service and the coastal defense boat CD-22 leaving Dasol Bay to search for the Americans.  LCDR Frank E. Haylor positioned HAKE for an attack on the destroyer, who turned away to re-enter the bay.  The set-up was too dangerous for an attack on CD-22, who was already pinging, so Haylor broke off.

HARDER on the other hand charged!  Dealey’s performance so far had earned him the moniker “destroyer killer” for his propensity to attack escorts.  Dealey boldly fired “down the throat” at the sub-chaser, who, by 0710 had detected both Americans.  HAKE heard a string of 15 detonations at 0728.  She evaded, then resurfaced that evening to contact HARDER.  Dealey and HARDER were nowhere to be seen.

Watch the POD for more “Today in Naval History”   27 AUG 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Alden, John D.  U.S. Submarine Attacks During World War II.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1989, p. 126.

Blair, Clay, Jr.  Silent Victory:  The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, Vol 2.  New York, NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975, pp. 691-94.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, pp. 184, 200, 242.

Holmes, Harry.  The Last Patrol.  Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, Ltd., 1994, pp. 123-24.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Japanese records captured after the surrender documented that CD-22’s barrage of depth charges resulted in a rising plume of oil and debris that was undoubtedly the wreckage of HARDER.  None of HARDER’s crew survived.

          CDR Samuel David Dealey was one of the most decorated submariners of WWII.  In addition to the Medal of Honor, he received the Navy Cross (4 awards), the Army Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, and lesser awards.  (Dealey Plaza in Dallas, the site of the JFK assassination, is named for CDR Dealey’s uncle, George B. Dealey, a Dallas newspaper publisher).

          Chester Nimitz, Jr. was the son of the Fleet Admiral.  He was a veteran of WWII and Korean submarine service, having been awarded the Navy Cross also.

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                                    WOLFPACKS IN THE PACIFIC?

Hitler’s U-boat wolfpacks in the Atlantic innovated the deployment of submarines in that theater.  According to Winston Churchill, those U-boats came close to crippling England’s economy.  American submariners in the Pacific took note and toyed with the idea of deploying in similar wolfpacks against Japanese shipping.  But there were theater differences.  The Pacific covers a much broader expanse than does the Atlantic, and the number of American subs available for Pacific wolfpacks did not equal the fleet of German U-boats, especially early in the war.  Allied Atlantic convoys often numbered 80 or more vessels, supplying a wealth of targets for German U-boats.  Japanese convoys, on the other hand, were smaller, often less than eight ships, because the Imperial Japanese Navy lacked sufficient escorts to guard large convoys.  Grouping US submarines around such widely dispersed and small convoys seemed a waste of resources, especially when the first torpedo into any convoy would scatter the remaining targets.  Many Pacific submarine skippers thought their chances were better alone.

This philosophy was reinforced on a dark and stormy night in the experience of USS RASHER (SS-269).  Her 5^th war patrol 22 July-3 September 1944 was spent in the South China Sea west of the Philippines.  In a pouring rain at 2130 this night RASHER picked up a larger than usual convoy of a dozen odd freighters escorted by destroyers and aircraft.  Her first target, the gasoline tanker Teiyo Maru, erupted in a massive fireball that rose 1000 feet in the air.  The escorts flailed haplessly in the storm.  With depth charges booming harmlessly two miles astern, skipper CDR Henry G. Munson lined up again.  The freighter Eishin Maru broke in two and RASHER’s torpedoes hit but didn’t stop two others.  Confused escorts fired in all compass directions at once.  At one point two of the destroyers fired on each other as Munson slipped to the far side of the convoy.  Here he launched a 10-torpedo spread at ships grouped around another large tanker.  She burst into flames and started for the bottom.  Even ships in the far column were hit by “tin fish” that missed their primary targets.  Munson hauled off to reload and called for help.  Then after midnight he lined up yet again, sinking the troop transport Teia Maru and forcing Noshiro Maru to beach on a distant island.  Out of torpedoes, Munson turned for home.  SPADEFISH (SS-411) and BLUEFISH (SS-222) got their licks in the following day.  It was later determined that Munson’s second tanker was in fact the 20000-ton escort carrier IJN TAIYO!  His total for this single-boat attack was four sunk–55,700 tons–and four damaged in the war’s best patrol to this point.  Munson’s success argued that wolfpacks would not be needed for the time being in the Pacific.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   24 AUG 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Alden, John D.  U.S. Submarine Attacks During World War II.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1989, pp. 124-25.

Blair, Clay, Jr.  Silent Victory:  The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, Vol 2.  New York, NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975, pp. 677-79.

Cressman, Robert J.  The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2007, p. 248.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 6 “R-S”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1976, pp. 36-37.

Sasgen, Peter.  Hellcats: The Epic Story of World War II’s Most Daring Submarine Raid.  New York, NY: New American Library, 2010, pp. 84-85.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  RASHER’s success notwithstanding, wolfpacks were employed later in the Pacific war, but in many cases incorporating fewer subs in each wolfpack than did the Germans in the Atlantic.

Like most pre-nuclear American submarines, RASHER was named for a fish.  The rasher, Sebastodes miniatus, is an important food and sport fish of our northern Pacific coast, also known as the vermillion rockfish.

CAPT Henry Glass “Hank” Munson survived the war to fight in the subsequent Korean Conflict.  He continued to develop submarine weapons and doctrine during the Cold War and directed the investigation into the loss of THRESHER (SSN-593).  He is a three-time awardee of the Navy Cross.  In retirement he taught high school physics.  He passed away in 1975 and, along with his wife, was buried at sea off Hawaii.

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