FALL OF CORREGIDOR

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines began within hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Landing in the Lingayen Gulf, they swept southward across the island of Luzon toward Manila, Subic Bay, and the Bataan peninsula in between.  The Japanese onslaught was overpowering.  On 10 December 1941 the Navy Yard at Cavite was bombed, and by December 21^st, the headquarters of the Naval Defense Forces of the Philippines had to be moved to the island of Corregidor off the southern end of Bataan.

Steadily the staunch but outmanned American defenders were pushed down the Bataan peninsula toward Corregidor.  Fighting every inch of the way, hoping in vain to stall the enemy until reinforcements could arrive, combined US and Philippine forces held out for months.  US Army troops made their last stand on Mt. Samat, a 588-foot hill in central Bataan.  Wounded, starving and dehydrated, they surrendered on April 9^th.  Those who were captured were marched 100 miles up Luzon in the hot Philippine dry season.  Mortality on this merciless march approached 50%, earning its designation as the “Bataan Death March.”  The remaining Army and Navy personnel fled to Corregidor two and a half miles offshore, including COL Samuel L. Howard, USMC, and his 4^th Marines from Naval Station Subic Bay.

Corregidor is a three square mile fortified island that in 1942 was home to an airfield, parade ground, extensive barracks, and numerous gun emplacements.  Tunnels sunk deeply into Malinta hill provided underground storage, command bunkers, and a hospital.  As the situation deteriorated, GEN Douglas MacArthur was ordered to leave his command post deep in the Malinta Tunnels.  On a dark night of 11 March, as he and wife and son stepped onto four PT boats, he uttered his famous promise, “I shall return.”

The garrison was now under the command of LGEN Jonathan M. Wainwright and by May the situation was desperate.  Howard, his Marines, and 700 bluejackets defended Corregidor’s beaches.  The Japanese bombardment was unrelenting.  Though the gun batteries on the island fought bravely many were hindered by the fact that the guns were cemented in place facing the wrong direction (traditionally it had been thought that attack would come from the sea).  To make matters worse most of their ammunition consisted of armor piercing anti-ship rounds–of limited use against planes and personnel.  Subjected to heavy 24-hour bombardment, the 13,000 weary and hungry troops endured until the 6^th of May.  Then, to save further carnage, Wainwright surrendered the garrison.  Navy personnel (including nurses) taken prisoner totaled 1700.  Wainwright and COL Howard survived the war as POWs, Howard received the Navy Cross and was promoted to MGEN.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  12 MAY 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Aluit, Alfonso J.  Corregidor.  Manila, Philippines: Galleon Publications, 1989.

Hall of Valor, Navy Cross Citation of Samuel Lutz Howard.  Military Timee website, AT: https://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient/recipient-7713/, retrieved 24 April 2026.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol 3  The Rising Sun in the Pacific.  Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1948, pp. 193-206.

Morris, Eric.  Corregidor: The End of the Line.  New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1981.

Site visit, Bataan Peninsula, Corregidor Island, Mt. Samat, Republic of the Philippines, February 1989.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1991, pp. 165-66.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The fall of the Philippines on this day was the last in a series of stunning Allied defeats at the beginning of the Pacific war that stretched from Pearl Harbor to Wake Island to Singapore.  Radio broadcasts from the garrison on Corregidor during the final days had been relayed back to American living rooms, giving the general public a sense of involvement in the loss.  But the situation brightened in the days that followed, as news of the battle of Coral Sea reached America.

          The WWII escort carrier USS CORREGIDOR (CVE-58) remembers the battle for the island.  Our modern Arleigh Burke destroyer HOWARD (DDG-83) remembers a Marine Corps 1^st SGT from Vietnam with the same surname.

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                                 YAMATO’S DESPERATION SORTIE

A second offshore phase of operation “Ten-Go” involved the Imperial Navy.  Its warships were to sally forth and blast what remained of the Allied invasion fleet after the April 6^th kikusui raid.  But by this date, the once proud Imperial Navy was but a shadow of its former might.  From war-worn bases in the Inland Sea, Combined Fleet Commander ADM Jisaburo Ozawa could muster only a small “Special Surface Attack Force” of a light cruiser, eight destroyers, and the super-battleship YAMATO.  This 863-foot, 68,000-ton leviathan sported nine 18.1 inch guns that could hurl a 3200-pound shell 22 ¹/₂ miles.  On this last-gasp mission, no air cover could be provided, and YAMATO could be spared only enough fuel for a one-way trip.  Most realized YAMATO would probably not survive what amounted to a suicide mission.  According to historian Russell Spurr, it was the Japanese naval command’s intent that the battleship ravage the American flotilla, then beach herself.  Her guns would form a defensive battery, and her surviving crew would scurry ashore to augment the Japanese land forces.  Under the overall command of VADM Seiichi Ito, the force got underway from Tokuyama at 1520 on the 6^th.  They were spotted at 1745 by THREADFIN (SS-410) in the Inland Sea, and three hours later by HACKLEBACK (SS-295), but neither sub could position for an attack.

VADM Marc Mitscher’s airstrike against YAMATO launched at 1000 this morning, and at 1230 BENNINGTON’s (CV-20) pilots bloodied YAMATO’s nose with two bombs near the mainmast.  For the next two hours the battleship endured near continuous attack.  Her inexperienced anti-aircraft gunners were unable to hit much at all.  In the first hour, YAMATO took five torpedo hits to the port boiler rooms and began to list.  Skipper RADM Kosaka Ariga ordered the starboard boiler rooms counter-flooded before several hundred sailors could be evacuated.  YAMATO now had but one turning screw.  The fourth attack wave brought more portside torpedoes and ten more bomb hits.  YAMATO’s deck plates cracked and crumpled, her list rendered her guns inoperable, the water-tight radio shack flooded, and a blast to sick bay killed the medical officer and corpsmen.  TBM Avengers now made runs so low and measured that LTJG William T. Delaney’s caught fire from his torpedo’s blast.  The last wave struck at 1400.  Communications aboard YAMATO went out, and she rolled onto her beam ends.  Loose shells crashed about, exploding, and at 1423 a giant mushroom cloud signaled the end.

In the enemy’s last naval sortie of WWII, 2498 battleship sailors died, including admirals Ito and Ariga.  The cruiser and four destroyers were sunk as well.  Taken to be revenge for the loss of USS ARIZONA (BB-39) at Pearl Harbor, only 10 US planes were downed.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  13 APR 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Dull, Paul S.  A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945).  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, pp. 333-35, 1978.

Mitsuru, Yoshida.  Requiem for Battleship Yamato.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1985.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol 14  Victory in the Pacific.  Little, Brown and Co., Boston, MA, pp. 199-209, 1960.

Rohwer, Jurgen and Gerhard Hummelchen.  Chronology of the War at Sea  1939-1945.  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, p. 346, 1992.

Spurr, Russell.  A Glorious Way to Die:  The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato, April 1945.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1981.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Historians argue today whether YAMATO’s sortie was indeed a suicide mission.  Nevertheless, the sortie is often described as the last “banzai charge” of the Imperial Navy.  Four destroyers survived, FUYUTSUKIi, HATSUSHIMO, YUKIKAZE, and SUZUTSUKI, the latter creeping back to Sasebo stern-first after American bombers blew off her bow.  These and a handful of submarines constituted all the remained of the Imperial Japanese bluewater Navy.  Never to be a threat for the remainder of the war, the above destroyers were sunk at their moorings by American aircraft a month later.

LTJG Delaney crashed into the water in the midst of the Japanese fleet and hid under his inflatable life raft as the battle raged.  He was spotted by one of the last departing US planes, who radioed a PBM Mariner circling out of range.  He was picked up, literally, amongst the bobbing heads of hundreds of Japanese sailors.

The wreck of YAMATO was located in 1984.  She lies in two pieces under 1100 feet of water, 180 miles southwest of Kyushu.  Plans to raise the battleship, at Japanese government expense, to recover the remains of her crew never came to fruition.

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                                 “FLOATING CHRYSANTHEMUMS”

The Japanese plan for defense of Okinawa was known by the language characters “Ten-Go.”  While defenders on land waged a battle of attrition, Japanese air and naval forces would engage the American invasion fleet.  But the Japanese air forces were flagging.  Most of their planes and skilled pilots had been lost, the technology of their remaining aircraft was out-classed by the American Hellcat and Corsair, and their reserves of fuel were nearly spent.  This desperate situation bred a desperate response.

Kamikazes first appeared at the battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944.  They attacked in small groups, usually under fighter escort.  The first kamikaze pilots came from the ranks of veterans and could fly the ideal approach–a near vertical plunge from above the anti-aircraft barrage that was aimed amidships, at the base of the bridge structure.  Such a flight profile required evasion of enemy combat air patrols and proper timing of the push-over.  But as attrition claimed experienced pilots, the remaining resorted to a simpler, shallow, glide-in approach with its devastating exposure to anti-aircraft fire.  By Okinawa, kamikaze tactics had matured.  They appeared at dusk, out of the setting sun, sometimes approaching “on the deck,” below radar.  Planes were sent in mass flights, kikusui’s (“floating chrysanthemums”), 50 or more at a time, striking from all directions at once.  The target of choice was the aircraft carrier or battleship, but to the eyes of inexperienced pilots, destroyers appeared equally tempting.  One advanced variation, the baka, was a 500-knot rocket-propelled glide bomb, manned by a suicide pilot, and launched from the belly of a larger plane.

The terror of kamikazes cannot be overstated.  Initially American sailors were aghast that pilots would willfully sacrifice themselves in such a manner.  As we had never imagined such a weapon, our defenses were not up to the task.  Ultimately, radar pickets, interception sorties, raids on home airfields, and robust anti-air defenses insured that the majority of the hundreds of kamikazes thrown at the Allies off Okinawa failed in their attempt to glorify the Emperor.  Nevertheless, those who succeeded wrought death and destruction beyond description.  On this date, the first in a series of ten kikusui raids claimed the destroyers BUSH (DD-529) and COLHOUN (DD-801), the minesweeper EMMONS (DMS-22), an LST and the cargo ships Hobbs Victory and Logan Victory.  Twelve more were damaged including four crippled beyond repair; MORRIS (DD-417), LEUTZE (DD-481), NEWCOMB (DD-586), and WITTER (DE-636).

Kamikazes proved to be Japan’s most effective weapon against our Navy in WWII, sinking more ships and killing more sailors than any other weapon system.  Off Okinawa, they claimed most of the 34 ships sunk and 368 damaged and were responsible for most of the 4907 sailors killed. 

Continued tomorrow…

Astor, Gerald.  Operation Iceberg:  The Invasion and Conquest of Okinawa in World War II–An Oral History.  New York, NY: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1995.

Belote, James H. and William M. Belote.  Typhoon of Steel:  The Battle for Okinawa.  New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1970.

Hoyt, Edwin P.  The Kamikazes.  New York, NY: Arbor House, 1983.

Inoguchi, Rikihei and Tadashi Nakajima.  The Divine Wind:  Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1958.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol 14  Victory in the Pacific.  Little, Brown and Co., Boston, MA, pp. 181-282, 1960.

Poolman, Kenneth.  Allied Escort Carriers of World War Two in Action.  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, p. 225, 1988.

Rohwer, Jurgen and Gerhard Hummelchen.  Chronology of the War at Sea  1939-1945.  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, pp. 345-46, 1992.

Silverstone, Paul H.  “Naval Intelligence”.  Sea Classics, Vol 28 (4), pp. 6, 70, April 1995.

Yahara, Hiromichi.  The Battle for Okinawa.  New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.

Zimmerman, Robert.  “Okinawa:  A Last Step on the Bloodstained Road to Japan”.  San Diego Union-Tribune, p. A16, 1 Apr 1995.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  In the 3^rd kikusui raid on April 16^th LAFFEY (DD-724) was crashed by four bombs and six kamikazes (17 others missed or were shot down), killing or horribly burning 103 crewmen.  Though every gun aboard was disabled, she is remembered today as the US Navy warship to endure the single most intense enemy attack and remain afloat.

A surviving example of the baka can be seen at Navy Museum of the Washington Navy Yard.

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                                    PhM1c JOHN HARLAN WILLIS

By D-Day + 9 on Iwo Jima, intense fighting was raging in several acres of low hills and gullies that would come to be known as the “meat grinder” just west of the central airfield.  Here a complex system of tunnels and bunkers gave the enemy the ability to pop up unexpectedly, sometimes behind surprised Marines.  The line of advance fluctuated hourly, Marines in the lead often found themselves suddenly cut off from their comrades, only to be re-united as the “front” shifted again.  Fighting was very close, at times foes were separated only by the crest of a hill or by the space between adjoining shell craters.  Canteens indifferently placed on the edges of fighting holes sometimes disappeared to thirsty Japanese hiding just a few feet away.  This day the Marines of Company H, 3^rd Battalion, 27^th Marines, 5^th MarDiv found themselves spearheading the advance on Hill 362A.

Like most corpsmen on Iwo, Pharmacist’s Mate First Class John H. Willis had been fighting a nine-day battle to save countless wounded Marines.  Exposing himself repeatedly to enemy fire, Willis had too often watched too many of his friends die.  This morning, while working to save a wounded comrade on the slope of Hill 362A, Willis himself was hit with shrapnel.

He had to be ordered out of the field, and Willis tarried at the battalion aid station only long enough to be bandaged.  Then without permission he returned to his company.  He found the Marines gradually falling back in the face of overwhelming mortar, grenade, and hand-to-hand fighting.  When two Marines were observed to fall in a nearby shell crater, Willis ran to their aid.  The corpsman began setting up a plasma infusion as the rest of his company continued to fall back.  The enemy quickly surrounded his shell crater, and a grenade thudded onto the ground at his knees.  Willis picked up the bomb reflexively and hurled it back in the direction from which it had come.  He turned again to his work–and another grenade landed at his feet.  Again, Willis threw it back.  Another, and yet another grenade landed, and each time Willis sent them arching.  The frustrated enemy now threw multiple grenades at once.  From a distance PhM3c Prince watched as his best friend began hurling these, incredibly launching eight grenades from the crater.  Then with his arm poised to throw the ninth, Willis and the Marines he was fighting to save disappeared in a violent explosion.

Third Battalion surgeon LCDR James Vedder recommended Willis for the Medal of Honor, which was accepted by his wife and the newborn child John Willis never saw.  He has been remembered with USS John Willis (DE-1027) and the Willis Gate on NSA Mid-South in Millington, TN.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  5 MAR 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, p. 553.

Site visit.  Rose Hill Cemetery, Columbia, Tennessee, 14 May 2003.

United States Congress.  United States of America’s Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients and their Official Citations.  Columbia Heights, MN: Highland House II, 1994, pp. 478-79.

Vedder, James S.  Surgeon on Iwo:  Up Front with the 27^th Marines.  Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984, pp. 112-13.

Wheeler, Richard.  Iwo. Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1980, pp. 182-83.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Witnessing the bravery of their corpsman inspired the Marines of How Company to renewed ferocity and rallied them to re-advance across the same territory (“How” was the WWII phonetic alphabet representation for “H”).  Willis’ body was recovered and buried in the 5^th Division cemetery on Iwo Jima.  The remains from all the temporary American cemeteries on Iwo Jima were re-interred after the war in Arlington, the Punchbowl, and other stateside cemeteries.  PhM1c Willis’ body was removed to Rose Hill Cemetery in his native Columbia, Tennessee.  Today the frequent earthquakes on Iwo Jima continue to expose lost remains of both Japanese and Americans.  Indeed, the Japanese government considers Iwo Jima to be an open grave.

Even more heroic than the actions of Navy corpsmen on Iwo Jima were the efforts of the stretcher bearer teams.  These combat Marines, usually junior PFC’s and privates, bore countless wounded comrades to safety, but the necessity to stand and walk to do so made them easy targets.  Mortality rates among stretcher bearers on Iwo Jima were higher than for any other combat specialists, as high as 80%.

Hill 362A was named for the height of its crest above sea level.  There were three hills of the same height in the area, designated 362A, 362B and 362C.  “Hotel” is the representation for “H” in our current NATO phonetic alphabet.

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                                       OPERATION “HAILSTORM”

Truk (now Chuuk) along with Yap, Pohnpei, and Korsae, comprise the Federated States of Micronesia in the South Pacific.  An encircling reef forms Chuuk’s outer perimeter, creating a large, sheltered lagoon 40 miles in diameter that is peppered with a dozen islands.  During WWII this ideal natural harbor was used by the Japanese as their main forward naval base, much as Pearl Harbor was to our Navy.  When the Allied island-hopping campaign gained momentum in 1943-44, Truk represented a key target.

Three carrier groups of RADM Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 58, and a group from Task Force 50, all part of ADM Raymond A. Spruance’s FIFTH FLEET, staged a surprise attack on the facility 82 years ago this week.  Torpedo planes, dive bombers, and fighters from nine fleet carriers and four light carries conducted a two-day “hailstorm” attack involving 1250 sorties.  Truk’s ship repair docks, supply depots, 265 aircraft, and four airfields were destroyed.  The attack caught many Japanese ships in the lagoon and over 30 supply ships (140,000 tons) and several destroyers were sunk.  None of the Japanese battleships were in port at the time, and in a curious parallel to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, neither were any enemy carriers.  The attack was so successful in isolating the base however, that surviving Japanese personnel became marooned on the island until the end of the war.

Losses sustained by US forces were limited to 30 aircraft and damage to USS INTREPID (CV-11).  A Nakajima B5N “Kate” torpedo-bomber from Truk’s Param airfield hit INTREPID with a single torpedo, striking her 15 feet below the waterline on the starboard quarter.  Though the crew was able to contain the damage, her rudder jammed hard aport.  CAPT Thomas L. Sprague turned back toward Hawaii and was able to make headway by racing the port engine and idling the starboard.  But two days later strong winds began buffeting the ship.  The breeze pushed her onto a westward heading, toward Tokyo.  Not wishing to go that direction, the crew jury-rigged a “sail” of sewn-together hatch covers and spare canvas.  Steerage was thus regained and on February 24^th, still “under sail,” INTREPID stood in to Pearl.

The Japanese stranded on Truk as a result of this raid forbade the locals from salvaging the sunken ships.  In an unparalleled stroke of good fortune, the ban on salvage activity continues to this day.  As a result, Chuuk today is a sport diver’s paradise.  Trucks, airplanes, tanks, and other military equipment can still be seen on the decks of these sunken ships, and the holds still contain munitions, spare parts, crew artifacts, and in some cases, even crew remains.  As such, the utmost respect is demanded of visitors.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  25 FEB 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, pp. 446-47.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol 7  Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls.  Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1951, pp. 315-32.

Parzymieso, Michael.  “Truk Diary.”  Sea Classics, Vol 49 (7), July 2016, pp. 10-14, 56-58.

Rems, Alan P.  “Two Birds with One Hailstone.”  Naval History, Vol 28 (1), February 2014, pp. 16-21.

Site visit, Chuuk Lagoon, Federated States of Micronesia, November 1988.

Stewart, William H.  Ghost Fleet of the Truk Lagoon, Japanese Mandated Islands.  Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Pub Co., 1985, pp. 17-46.

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                                   THEODORE EDSON CHANDLER

Theodore Edson Chandler was born at Annapolis on 26 December 1894 into a distinguished Navy family.  His father, the future RADM Lloyd H. Chandler, attended the Naval Academy at the time.  Young Chandler followed in his father’s footsteps, entering the Naval Academy in 1911.  After a combat tour on the WWI destroyer CONNER (DD-72) he assumed the position of executive officer aboard the newly launched destroyer CHANDLER (DD-206).  That ship had been named in honor of Chandler’s late grandfather, William Eaton Chandler, President Chester Arthur’s Secretary of the Navy.  Theodore served between the Wars aboard several battleships and destroyers, even aspiring to a brief tour with the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

In the months before the still neutral US entered WWII, (now) CAPT T.E. Chandler commanded OMAHA (CL-4) in the Atlantic Fleet’s Neutrality Patrol.  One task in this employ was to enforce international laws governing ships of combatant nations who might call on American ports.  In the wee hours of 6 November 1941 OMAHA came across a curiously darkened ship out of Philadelphia showing the name Willmoto.  A suspicious Chandler stopped the freighter, who proved in truth to be the German blockade runner Odenwald, illegally running rubber to the Weimar Republic.  “Willmoto” was taken into custody.  Soon-to-be-changed Navy regs required that Chandler supervise her sale at public auction, the last instance in our Navy’s history when a warship’s crew shared “prize money.”  Chandler was promoted to RADM in May of 1943 and transferred to the Pacific in October 1944.  He served under VADM Jesse B. Oldendorf as commander BatDiv 2 during the battle of Leyte Gulf and the liberation of the Philippines.

Then at 1730 on 6 January 1945 a Japanese kamikaze crashed the starboard bridge of USS LOUISVILLE (CA-28), flagship of Commander PacFlt Cruiser Division 4, RADM T.E. Chandler, operating in the Lingayen Gulf in support of the Allied invasion of Luzon.  Chandler was thrown to the deck and doused with flaming gasoline.  Heedless of his severe burns however, he pitched in with his enlisted rates, manhandling fire hoses and supervising damage control.  He patiently waited for medical aid, allowing those more seriously injured to be attended.  Only when he had been satisfied that the needs his sailors had been met did he allow himself to be treated.  But by then the effects of his pulmonary burns were too severe to reverse.  He died this following day.  For his gallant sacrifice he is a recipient of the Navy Cross.  The WWII Gearing-class destroyer THEODORE E. CHANDLER (DD-717) bore his name, as does our former Kidd-class guided missile destroyer DDG-996.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  11 JAN 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 7 “T-V”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, pp. 127-28.

 Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol 13  The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindinao, the Visayas.  Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., 1959, pp. xii, 109.

Theodore E. Chandler

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                                    MONAGHAN vs. THE TEMPEST

The Pacific war was a long one for USS MONAGHAN (DD-354).  She was the ready destroyer at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 and was just getting underway to investigate a report of a submarine off the entrance to the harbor when all hell broke loose.  She went on to fight at the Coral Sea, Midway, and in the Aleutians.  December 1944 found her screening carriers of the 3^rd Fleet for airstrikes against the Japanese in the Philippines.  December 17^th had been designated for refueling at sea, however rough seas postponed that evolution for a day.

But through the night the weather only worsened.  Water Tender 2^nd Class Joseph C. McCrane didn’t get much sleep and around 0630 the 18^th arose to find MONAGHAN in the throes of a severe typhoon.  She rode better than did her sisters with less fuel, MONAGHAN still had 76% of her capacity on board.  But by 0800 that mattered little–even the carriers had abandoned station-keeping and were fending for themselves.  The destroyer was rolling frighteningly, and McCrane and WT3c Les Bryan were sent to ballast the empty aft fuel tanks.  They struggled to keep their footing and labored even harder to accomplish their task.  Upon finishing, they took shelter with a growing group of shipmates in the aft 5″ gun turret.

But the rolls only got worse.  After seven or eight rolls onto her beam ends, MONAGHAN’s sailors in the gun turret recognized how untenable was their shelter!  They began to pile out onto the deck, Gunner’s Mate Joe Guio standing just outside the hatch in disregard of his own safety, to help his shipmates.  Loose gear crashed about, and cracks started to rip the overheads from the bulkheads below decks.  Electric power failed, then steerage.  And just at this moment the group of sailors was swept overboard.  Someone had the sense to throw a liferaft at the dozen or so flailing in the water.

The scene shifted to the liferaft, where nine made it aboard and clung for dear life.  Several hours later a half-naked, shivering Guio drifted by the raft and was pulled aboard.  McCrane cradled Guio to keep him warm through the night.  The next morning Guio awoke, thanked his shipmates for hauling him to safety, then curled up in the bottom of the raft.  Half an hour later he was dead.  Hypothermia claimed two more in the days that followed.  Another went mad, insisting he saw an island and disappearing overboard.  At one point an onion drifted by the famished sailors.  But an 8-foot shark circling nearby discouraged any recovery.  The only survivors from MONAGHAN were the six in this liferaft, rescued this day by BROWN (DD-546) (along with 13 from HULL (DD-350) who also foundered in this typhoon).  The exact time and details of MONAGHAN’s demise will never be known.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  27 DEC 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 4 “L-M”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1969, pp. 412-14.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol XIII  The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindinao, the Visayas.  Little Brown and Co., Boston, MA, 1959, pp. 71-77.

Parkin, Robert Sinclair.  Blood on the Sea:  American Destroyers Lost in World War II.  New York, NY: Sarpedon, 1995, pp. 274-79.

Roscoe, Theodore.  United States Destroyer Operations in World War II.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1953, pp. 449-50.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  FADM Nimitz said this storm, “…represented a more crippling blow to the 3^rd Fleet than it might be expected to suffer in anything less than a major action.”

Turreted guns are not secured to the deck by anything other than their massive weight.  As such, should the destroyer capsize, the turrets would simply fall out of their cradles and sink like rocks, carrying anyone inside to Davy Jones.

MONAGHAN remembers ENS John R. Monaghan, a Spanish-American War veteran who was killed in a Samoan uprising in 1899 while trying to rescue his stricken Commanding Officer.  USS BROWN remembers George Brown, an Able Seaman who died aboard USS INTREPID during that ship’s daring raid in Tripoli Harbor in the Barbary Wars of 1804.  HULL, of course, remembers Commodore Isaac Hull, commander of USS CONSTITUTION during her engagement with HMS GUERRIER in 1812.

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                                   WHERE WERE THE CARRIERS?

Most everyone will recall that one significant shortcoming of the Pearl Harbor raid from the Japanese perspective was its failure to destroy the American Navy’s aircraft carriers.  Yamamoto had targeted them in particular, appreciating as he did, the importance of naval air power.  It was with some disappointment that the airstrike launched knowing the carriers were not in port.  But just where were our carriers at 0755, 7 December 1941?

For the past year, US attentions had focused on the Atlantic where four of our seven carriers were based.  German U-boats had already attacked US warships escorting freighters on Roosevelt’s “Neutrality Patrol.”  In fact, REUBEN JAMES (DD-245) had been sunk in September 1941 on just such a mission.  Dawn on December 7^th found YORKTOWN (CV-5) in Norfolk and RANGER (CV-4) a day out, both having just finished Neutrality Patrols.  Brand new HORNET (CV-8), just 2 months in commission, was also readying herself in Norfolk.  WASP (CV-7) was serving as our training carrier and lay at anchor in Grassy Bay, Bermuda, observing the usual Sunday morning routine between Caribbean cruises.

In the Pacific, SARATOGA (CV-3) was fresh out of dry-dock in Bremerton.  The morning of December 7^th found her pulling into San Diego to embark Marine Corps aircraft intended for Wake.  After hearing the news from Hawaii, SARATOGA got underway immediately, hoping to reinforce the besieged garrison at Wake.  She reached Pearl Harbor on the 15^th, stopping only for fuel.  But the tiny island outpost at Wake fell before SARATOGA could arrive.

Two carriers were in the waters around Hawaii.  ENTERPRISE (CV-6) was returning from an aircraft ferrying assignment, having delivered VMF-211 to Wake Island.  She had planned to make Pearl that day, in fact, her scout planes arrived over the harbor in the midst of the Japanese attack and joined the defense.  She pulled in on this day, pausing briefly to refuel, then departed to hunt down the Japanese.  Though she did not locate the enemy strike force, her aircraft did sink the sub I-170 on the 10^th.  Our oldest flattop in service, LEXINGTON (CV-2), was returning from Midway, having likewise delivered a squadron of Marine fighters.  Upon learning of the Pearl Harbor attack she promptly launched search planes in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the Japanese fleet, then diverted south to rendezvous with ENTERPRISE and INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35).

After today’s disaster, YORKTOWN cast off for Hawaii on December 16^th.  HORNET was readied for Doolittle’s Tokyo raid, departing Norfolk on 4 March 1942.  WASP was pulled from training duties and eventually transferred to the Pacific after the loss of YORKTOWN at Midway in June 1942.  RANGER remained in the Atlantic.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  13 DEC 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 2 “C-F”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, p. 356.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, pp. 368, 434.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 4 “L-M”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1969, pp. 47, 104.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 6 “R-S”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1976, pp. 31, 85, 340.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 8 “W-Z”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, pp. 144, 534.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  RANGER is perhaps the least well-remembered of our seven pre-WWII carriers.  She remained in the Atlantic and Mediterranean until August 1944, when she also transferred to the Pacific.  Here she was relegated to pilot training duties off the California coast.

Our first carrier, the former LANGLEY (CV-1), was still in service, but had been converted to a seaplane tender (AV-3) in the 1930s.  She was operating with the Asiatic Fleet at the war’s outbreak and was sunk by Japanese planes in late February 1942.

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                              DETERMINATION vs. COMPLACENCY

Japan emerged from the First World War as a bona fide naval power, a rival to US primacy in the Pacific.  And as early as 1918, Imperial Defense Policy identified the United States as her foremost potential enemy.  The mandates of the 1922 Washington Disarmament Conference caused further dissention; Japan (correctly) perceiving that the US-backed formula for capital warship limitation was structured to insure American parity, if not dominance in the Pacific.  She reacted with a naval policy which acquiesced to US strength in numbers but emphasized ships of greater firepower.  Imperial naval cadets were indoctrinated with hostility toward America.  A decade later even the Japanese citizenry sensed the eventuality of war with the United States.  It was not a surprise then, when Japan vacated the continuing arms limitation talks in 1936.  The next year Japan began to solidify her western Pacific empire by inciting a war with China.

Meanwhile many US planners remained complacent, secure in a misplaced confidence in our strength and Japan’s weakness.  Unruffled US attitudes are reflected even days before the Pearl Harbor attack:

“Nobody now fears that a Japanese fleet could deal an unexpected blow on our Pacific possessions…Radio makes surprise impossible.”  Josephus Daniels, former Secretary of the Navy, 16 Oct 1922.

“War between Japan and the United States is not within the realm of reasonable possibility…A Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is a strategic impossibility.”   MAJ George Fielding Eliot, USA, military scientist, Sep 1938.

“The Hawaiian Islands are over-protected; the entire Japanese fleet and air force could not seriously threaten Oahu.”   CAPT William T. Pulleston, Chief of Naval Intelligence, Aug 1941.

“No matter what happens, the U.S. Navy is not going to be caught napping.”   Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 4 Dec 1941.

“Well, don’t worry about it…it’s nothing.”   LT Kermit Tyler, Ft. Shafter Duty Officer after being told the newly installed RADAR had picked up what appeared to be incoming aircraft, 7 Dec 1941.

Not until Japan invaded Indochina in July 1941 did we embargo oil and steel.  Historians credit that oil embargo as the final impetus inciting Japan to strike at the US Fleet.

Continued tomorrow…

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Cerf, Christopher and Victor Navasky.  The Experts Speak:  The Definitive Compendium of Authoritative Misinformation.  Pantheon Books, New York, NY, pp.115-16, 1984.

Fuchida, Mitsuo and Masatake Okumiya.  Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan.  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, pp. 25-32, 1955.

Prange, Gordon W.  At Dawn We Slept:  The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.  Penguin Books, New York, NY, pp. 3-8, 1981.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The anti-American sentiments in Japan in the decades before WWII are well described in Fuchida’s book above.  In fact, believing the United States to be her eventual enemy, Japan began in the 1920s to rotate the elite of her young naval officers through diplomatic or training duty in America.  By the late 1930s, the Imperial Navy had a core of senior officers familiar with American traditions, attitudes, and motivations.  Among these was Combined Fleet commander-in-chief ADM Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Some historians have criticized the Pearl Harbor attack this day for failing to destroy the shore facilities and even for failing to invade the Hawaiian Islands.  But Japan’s intentions were to impede the United States’ ability to intervene in the western Pacific long enough for Japan to secure an empire.  They targeted what they perceived to be the center of gravity of our seapower, the ships of our US Fleet–not the Pearl Harbor base nor the Hawaiian Islands.  Ironically, in the minds of US planners of that day our bases were the potential targets.  The presence of a strong fleet in port, it was reasoned, would cause a would-be aggressor to think twice.  Thus, following scheduled exercises in the Fall of 1941, the US Fleet normally homeported at San Pedro was held in Hawaii as a deterrent.

It could be argued that the Japanese assessment that our fleet was our center of gravity was flawed.  The ships could be replaced, but the forward bases essential to their operation in the Philippines, Guam, Wake and Shanghai proved difficult and costly to recover.

The post Determination vs. Complacency appeared first on Today in Naval History.

                                      LAST CALL FROM GRUNION

On 30 June 1942, LCDR Mannert L. Abele conned the new Gato-class submarine USS GRUNION (SS-216) out of Pearl Harbor on her first war patrol.  WWII was seven months old, and the first glimmers of success in the Pacific had been recorded weeks earlier at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway.  Efforts to reverse Japanese gains were beginning, in particular, their annoying presence on American soil in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska.  GRUNION was to patrol in that area, assigned to the sea lanes north of enemy-held Kiska Island.  Her first action came on 15 July when she fired three torpedoes unsuccessfully at a destroyer and was depth-charged for her efforts.  Later that same day Abele’s crew battled three sub chasers, this time sinking Ch. 25 and Ch. 27 and damaging the third.  She prowled the area for the next two weeks despite increasing Japanese wariness.  On this day, GRUNION reported heavy anti-submarine activity at the approaches to Kiska Harbor, receiving a recall to Dutch Harbor as well.  When nothing further was seen or heard from her thereafter, on 5 October GRUNION was officially listed as overdue and presumed lost.

Her demise remained a mystery, for Japanese records failed to report any sinking around the time of GRUNION’s disappearance.  Then in March 1963 a sailor claiming to have been the superintendent aboard the 8572-ton freighter Kano Maru came forward with the story that on 31 July 1942, the day after GRUNION’s last report, the freighter was steaming in heavy fog off Kiska.  Suddenly two torpedoes streaked toward her, one missing and the other penetrating without exploding aft of her starboard engine room.  Her machinery flooded and her generator and radio were knocked out.  Japanese merchant sailors sprang to their 8cm gun and began firing at a periscope wake to starboard.  Another torpedo passed harmlessly under the keel, followed by three more, two of which struck but again failed to detonate.  Kano Maru’s attacker then broke the surface to port in an apparent attempt to employ her deck gun.  A lucky shot from the Japanese gun riddled her conning tower just as her main deck went dry.  Then a tall spout of water erupted near the submarine, and she slipped beneath the waves.

If the above account truly describes GRUNION’s loss, modern navalists doubt that a single hit to her “sail” would have sunk the boat.  It is theorized that one of her own errant torpedoes may have circled back to strike GRUNION, a dangerous defect of early WWII torpedoes.  In any case, her 70 crewmen remain unaccounted for.  LCDR Abele was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross, and before the end of WWII he was further commemorated with the Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer USS MANNERT L. ABELE (DD-733). 

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  5 AUG 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 3 “G-K”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977, p. 170.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 4 “L-M”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1969, p. 222.

Holmes, Harry.  The Last Patrol.  Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, Ltd., 1994, pp. 24-25.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol VII  Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls.  Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1951, pp. 7, 12.

“Search for the USS Grunion.”  AT: http://ussgrunion.com/blog/2006/ 09/22/whitefish-engineer-returns-from-stormy-bering-sea-with-tale-of-discovery/, 5 October 2006.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  As illustrated above, the Mark 41 torpedo that was in use early in WWII was notoriously defective.  It often deviated from its set depth, and the fusing mechanism failed when the torpedo made a directly perpendicular hit (the desired attack angle).  Modern torpedoes do not arm until they have traveled a prescribed distance to prevent disaster if a torpedo accidentally circles back to its launch point.

In the years since WWII, surviving relatives of LCDR Abele conducted an intensive search for GRUNION.  After months of privately funded, open-ocean searching with towed side-scanning sonar, in August 2006 they announced the discovery of a hard target appearing to be the wreckage of a WWII submarine 2700 feet down off Kiska, just north of McArthur Reef.  This location supports the story of the Japanese sailor from 1963.  The identity of GRUNION’s wreck was confirmed by the Navy in October 2008.  Her 70 crewmen remain aboard.

USS MANNERT L. ABELE was also lost in WWII, falling victim to kamikazes off Okinawa 12 April 1945.

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