BROOKLYN BRIDGE COLLISION

          ARM CUAUHTÉMOC (BE-01) is the Mexican Navy’s three-masted sail training ship.  She remembers the last Aztec emperor during the 1520-21 Spanish conquest and associated smallpox epidemic.  Launched in September 1982, she is one of four sisters, GLORIA of Colombia, GUAYAMAS of Ecuador, and SIMON BOLIVAR of Venezuela.  Throughout her 43-year career to date, CUAUHTÉMOC had completed 39 major cruises, sailing over 400,000 NM with three global circumnavigations.  Her 2025 cadet cruise departed her homeport of Acapulco on 6 April destined for Iceland by way of the Aberdeen, Scotland, tall ships parade.  May 12^th last year marked her port call at New York City.

          CUAUHTÉMOC’s career had not been without mishap.  In 2007 she collided with a suspension bridge on the exit from the harbor of Bilbao, Spain.  Her departure that day was timed to coincide with a slackening high tide that left enough water to avoid grounding yet allowed clearance of an intervening suspension bridge.  Her departure was a bit premature, and the top 12 inches of her mainmast snapped off when she failed to clear the bridge.  She was not damaged sufficiently to warrant interrupting her cruise.  Then ten years later on 11 June 2017, a Mexican cadet fell overboard off India and was never recovered.

          This day found CUAUHTÉMOC departing New York under the conn of a harbor pilot.  A total of 277 visitors, dignitaries, and crewmen were aboard.  Cadets manned the yardarms in the traditional departure display.  But only four minutes after casting off from Pier 17, at 0824, the tall ship experienced an engine casualty.  Caught in the swift East River current, her pilot had only 80-90 seconds to react.  A desperate call for a second tug was not answered in time, and CUAUHTÉMOC was swept under the Brooklyn Bridge.  The bridge’s 135-foot clearance was too low for the 159-foot mast.  All three topmasts snapped off, plunging some sailors to the deck below while others dangled in the air, clinging to wreckage.  Two cadets, America Yamilet Sanchez and Adal Jair Maldonado, died hours later; 19 others were injured, two requiring hospitalization.  Damage to the bridge was insignificant.

          US Senate Minority Leader at the time, Charles “Chuck” Schumer (D,NY), postulated that Federal cuts under the Trump administration’s short-lived Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), run by Elon Musk, had contributed to the accident.  However, the subsequent National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation failed to validate that claim.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”   23-25 MAY 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Brown, Ruth and Kyle Marian Viterbo.  “Mexican Tall Ship Strikes Brooklyn Bridge, Snapping Masts and Killing 2 Cre Members.”  AP News.  AT: https://apnews.com/article/brooklyn-bridge-collision-mexican -navy-ship-ca335dc85ebfbf981bc38516985461c8, retrieved 26 May 2025.

Ghildial, Pratikshe; Jeroslav Lukiv and Ruth Comerford.  “Two Dead as Mexican Navy Ship Crashes into Brooklyn Bridge.”  BBC News.  AT: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c991n8p4pdyo, retrieved 26 May 2025.

Guarjardo, Adi and Liz Rozner.  “NTSB Gives First Update on Brooklyn Bridge Ship Crash.”  CBS News.  AT: https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/brooklyn-bridge-mexican-ship-crash-investigation/, Retrieved 26 May 2025.

The Guardian.  “Mexican Navy Says Ship’s Pilot in Deadly Bridge Crash was from New York.”  The Guardian website.  AT: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/20/mexico-ship-brooklyn-bridge-new-york-crash, retrieved 26 May 2025.

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                                 YAMATO’S DESPERATION SORTIE

A second offshore phase of operation “Ten-Go” involved the Imperial Navy.  Its warships were to sally forth and blast what remained of the Allied invasion fleet after the April 6^th kikusui raid.  But by this date, the once proud Imperial Navy was but a shadow of its former might.  From war-worn bases in the Inland Sea, Combined Fleet Commander ADM Jisaburo Ozawa could muster only a small “Special Surface Attack Force” of a light cruiser, eight destroyers, and the super-battleship YAMATO.  This 863-foot, 68,000-ton leviathan sported nine 18.1 inch guns that could hurl a 3200-pound shell 22 ¹/₂ miles.  On this last-gasp mission, no air cover could be provided, and YAMATO could be spared only enough fuel for a one-way trip.  Most realized YAMATO would probably not survive what amounted to a suicide mission.  According to historian Russell Spurr, it was the Japanese naval command’s intent that the battleship ravage the American flotilla, then beach herself.  Her guns would form a defensive battery, and her surviving crew would scurry ashore to augment the Japanese land forces.  Under the overall command of VADM Seiichi Ito, the force got underway from Tokuyama at 1520 on the 6^th.  They were spotted at 1745 by THREADFIN (SS-410) in the Inland Sea, and three hours later by HACKLEBACK (SS-295), but neither sub could position for an attack.

VADM Marc Mitscher’s airstrike against YAMATO launched at 1000 this morning, and at 1230 BENNINGTON’s (CV-20) pilots bloodied YAMATO’s nose with two bombs near the mainmast.  For the next two hours the battleship endured near continuous attack.  Her inexperienced anti-aircraft gunners were unable to hit much at all.  In the first hour, YAMATO took five torpedo hits to the port boiler rooms and began to list.  Skipper RADM Kosaka Ariga ordered the starboard boiler rooms counter-flooded before several hundred sailors could be evacuated.  YAMATO now had but one turning screw.  The fourth attack wave brought more portside torpedoes and ten more bomb hits.  YAMATO’s deck plates cracked and crumpled, her list rendered her guns inoperable, the water-tight radio shack flooded, and a blast to sick bay killed the medical officer and corpsmen.  TBM Avengers now made runs so low and measured that LTJG William T. Delaney’s caught fire from his torpedo’s blast.  The last wave struck at 1400.  Communications aboard YAMATO went out, and she rolled onto her beam ends.  Loose shells crashed about, exploding, and at 1423 a giant mushroom cloud signaled the end.

In the enemy’s last naval sortie of WWII, 2498 battleship sailors died, including admirals Ito and Ariga.  The cruiser and four destroyers were sunk as well.  Taken to be revenge for the loss of USS ARIZONA (BB-39) at Pearl Harbor, only 10 US planes were downed.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  13 APR 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Dull, Paul S.  A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945).  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, pp. 333-35, 1978.

Mitsuru, Yoshida.  Requiem for Battleship Yamato.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1985.

Morison, Samuel Eliot.  History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol 14  Victory in the Pacific.  Little, Brown and Co., Boston, MA, pp. 199-209, 1960.

Rohwer, Jurgen and Gerhard Hummelchen.  Chronology of the War at Sea  1939-1945.  USNI Press, Annapolis, MD, p. 346, 1992.

Spurr, Russell.  A Glorious Way to Die:  The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato, April 1945.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1981.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  Historians argue today whether YAMATO’s sortie was indeed a suicide mission.  Nevertheless, the sortie is often described as the last “banzai charge” of the Imperial Navy.  Four destroyers survived, FUYUTSUKIi, HATSUSHIMO, YUKIKAZE, and SUZUTSUKI, the latter creeping back to Sasebo stern-first after American bombers blew off her bow.  These and a handful of submarines constituted all the remained of the Imperial Japanese bluewater Navy.  Never to be a threat for the remainder of the war, the above destroyers were sunk at their moorings by American aircraft a month later.

LTJG Delaney crashed into the water in the midst of the Japanese fleet and hid under his inflatable life raft as the battle raged.  He was spotted by one of the last departing US planes, who radioed a PBM Mariner circling out of range.  He was picked up, literally, amongst the bobbing heads of hundreds of Japanese sailors.

The wreck of YAMATO was located in 1984.  She lies in two pieces under 1100 feet of water, 180 miles southwest of Kyushu.  Plans to raise the battleship, at Japanese government expense, to recover the remains of her crew never came to fruition.

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                                          OPERATION “CAESAR”

On 5 December 1944 the Type IX long-range U-boat U-864 departed Kiel, northern Germany, for Penang, Indochina (modern Malaysia).  The Japanese coveted German jet aircraft technology and U-864’s mission was to transport Messerschmitt “Swallow” jet engine parts and two aeronautical engineers, Rolf von Chlingenspreg and Riclef Schmerus, to the Emperor.  This mission, Operation “Caesar,” was one of several U-boat shipments in the final months of WWII.  Two Japanese nautical engineers, Tadao Yamoto and Toshio Nakai, were on board hitching a ride home.  As well, 1857 flasks (65 tons) of the strategic metal mercury, used for explosive primers, were packed as ballast along the keel.

But U-864 had problems.  Avoiding the many British patrols of the North Sea required cruising submerged, running her diesel engines via a schnorkel breathing device.  Korvettenkapitän Ralf-Reimar Wolfram hugged the Norway coast, at least until he ran aground and had to put in at Bergen, Norway, for repairs.  While there, on 12 January, the Bergen submarine base was bombed by the British, damaging U-864 further.  Wolfram could not get underway again until 30 January, trying to make a 10 February rendezvous with an escort off the Hellisoy Light on Fedje Island, Norway.  But on this day the U-boat’s starboard engine began missing, a noisy problem that demanded a return to Bergen.

Little did Wolfram know that the British were aware of his movements.  Code breakers at Bletchly Park had deciphered the German “Enigma” encoder and were reading the message traffic to U-864.  The submarine HMS VENTURER had been dispatched to the Hellisoy Light where LT James S. Launders, RN, lay in wait, submerged.  His passive sonar now picked up a strange motor noise.  Turning his periscope in the direction of the noise he spotted the feather wake of a schnorkel.  For two hours he remained submerged, tracking the contact with passive sonar and plotting her movements.  Launders then took up a position along her expected path and at the calculated moment fired a spread of four torpedoes.

Wolfram knew his noisy engine would give away his position and was zig-zagging underwater back to Bergen.  For several hours he coursed invisibly–he thought.  But out of nowhere the sonarmen suddenly heard high-speed propeller noises.  The first, second, and third torpedoes passed into the distance, but the fourth struck U-864 amidships.  She broke in two and sank, taking all hands, in this first recorded duel between two submerged submarines.

The wreck of U-864 was located in 2003.  Though she is a war grave, the mercury aboard represents a serious environmental hazard, and clean-up efforts by the Norwegian government are ongoing.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History’  13 FEB 26

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Brasse, Marc, Christopher Rowley and Karl Vandenhole, Directors.  “U-864: Hitler’s Last Deadly Secret.”  Military Channel documentary (November 2012), Discovery Communications, 2007.

Tarrant, V.E.  The U-Boat Offensive 1914-1945.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1989, p. 137.

Wynn, Kenneth.  U-Boat Operations of the Second World War  Vol 2: Career Histories, U511-UIT25.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1998, pp. 177-78.

The post Operation “Caesar” appeared first on Today in Naval History.

                                              McGOWAN’S RAID

The British and American naval fleets on Lake Ontario contested that region throughout the War of 1812.  In fact, the British began the 1814 fighting season by chasing American Commodore CAPT Isaac Chauncey’s squadron from its base at Oswego and blockading him at Sackets Harbor, New York, on the southern shore near the origin of the ST. LAWRENCE River.  In August, Chauncey lifted the blockade and chased the British back to their base at Kingston, 15 miles down the ST. LAWRENCE.  Here the enemy was just completing the impressive 112-gun ship-of-the-line HMS ST. LAWRENCE, whose firepower would tip the balance to His Majesty in the coming 1815 season.  Winter closed the 1814 campaigning season with Chauncey retired to Sackets Harbor, stewing over what to do about this new British warship.

Midshipman James McGowan from the brig USS SYLPH, 18, had one bold suggestion.  At 1800 on Saturday evening 12 November, he pushed off from Sackets Harbor in an open whaleboat.  With nine sailors and Mr. Johnson, a local pilot from the frigate USS MOHAWK, 42, he rowed five hours until squalls forced an encampment on the New York shore opposite Fox Island.  Not until Monday did the weather moderate, and about 1300 the eleven were underway again.  McGowan’s plan was to enter the ST. LAWRENCE and course along the south shore of Long Island (modern Wolfe Island) 12 more miles downriver.  Rounding the island, he would circle back eight miles to the British anchorage at Kingston.  He would attach enough explosive charges, known in that day as “torpedoes,” to ST. LAWRENCE to sink her.  That evening they camped seven miles into the river at Tibbets Bay, and Tuesday night they penetrated farther.  But the bright moonlight Tuesday night risked their discovery, and they camped at Mill Creek.  Storms again on Wednesday stalled any progress, and despite continued rain on this Thursday afternoon they got underway again.

But at Long Island’s tip they were spotted by two British rowboats on a plundering mission.  McGowan’s men pulled hard at their oars and rushed the British boats, capturing both at 1630 without firing a shot.  Several British gunboats lay a short distance away, and all hoped the twilight commotion had not triggered an alarm.  Worse, McGowan was now saddled with a dozen prisoners.  He could not let the prisoners go and guarding them would tie-up sailors critical to his mission.  Having no reasonable alternative, a disappointed McGowan slid his torpedoes into the river between himself and the gunboats, then turned back toward Sackets Harbor.  The mission had failed, but the War of 1812 ended a month later, before Commodore Chauncey could stage another attempt.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  24 NOV 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Cooper, James Fenimore.  History of the Navy of the United States of America, Vol. II.  Philadelphia, PA: Lea & Blanchard, 1840, pp. 338.

Crawford, Michael J.  The Naval War of 1812:  A Documentary History  Vol III, 1814-1815 Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean.  Washington, DC: GPO, 2002, pp. 665-66.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 6 “R-S”.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1976, p. 704.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, pp. 30-33.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812 was signed 24 December 1814.

          HMS ST. LAWRENCE was launched in September 1814 and made a cruise around Lake Ontario in October.  Her construction cannibalized three other warships and drained British resources in Lower Canada.  She never fired her guns in anger.  After the war she remained in Kingston, her deep draft preventing her movement down river.  She was sold in deteriorating condition in 1832 for a mere £25.  Used for storage at the end of a brewery’s pier, she rotted there and sank.  Her wreck is a Canadian National Historic Site.

Wolfe Island is the largest of about 1000 islands in the Canadian waters of Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence.  It was originally named “Ganounkovesnot” by the Indians, meaning “Long Island Standing Up.”  It was renamed by the British in 1792, after Royal Army General James Wolfe of Revolutionary War fame, but the former name persisted on American charts.

Three Navy destroyers have been named in honor of Isaac Chauncey, DD-3, DD-296 and DD-667.  Midshipman McGowan is not remembered today.  The WWII Fletcher-class destroyer McGOWAN (DD-678) commemorates WWI RADM Samuel McGowan.

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                                              VIRGINIUS AFFAIR

Historically our Navy has been tasked with the protection of American citizens overseas, as witnessed by a nearly explosive brush with Spain in 1873.  Cuban rebels were well into their 40-year struggle for independence from Spain, and in an effort to intercept gun-running to these rebels, the Spanish navy began patrolling the Caribbean.  A few US Navy vessels were stationed in the area as well to prevent filibustering under our flag.  Despite this, the American-flagged civilian paddlewheel steamer Virginius, a swift former Confederate blockade runner, made several weapons runs to Cuba.  On October 31^st Virginius was sighted by the Spanish cruiser Tornado and chased for eight hours.  She was caught off Jamaica and impounded in Santiago de Cuba.

President Ulysses S. Grant lodged an immediate protest with Spanish president Emilio Castelar y Ripoll.  But local Cuban authorities acted on their own before Spain could intercede.  The crewmen were tried and convicted, and between 7-8 November, 16 passengers and 37 crewmen from Virginius were dragged from their cells and executed by firing squad.  Among the victims was the skipper, Joseph Fry, a Naval Academy graduate and veteran of the US and Confederate Navies.  The American public was outraged–the New York Times stating that if news of the executions be true, “there will be nothing left…but to declare war.”  Within days USS WYOMING steamed into Santiago harbor with her guns run out, her captain, William B. Cushing, declaring to the local authorities, “If you intend to shoot any more of the Virginius prisoners, you would better first have the women and children removed from Santiago, as I shall bombard the town.”  In further preparation Grant ordered RADM David Dixon Porter to assemble the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet at Key West, along with COL Charles Heywood’s US Marines, to await developments.

Heated negotiation ensued between Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and the Spanish ambassador in Washington.  In the end, reason prevailed.  On November 28^th an accord was signed under which Spain agreed to release the ship and the remaining crew and to render an apology in the form of an official salute to the American Flag.  Virginius was released (but ironically, on her way to the United States she wrecked off Cape Fear).

The promised salute was never rendered.  The affair took a queer twist later, when it was discovered that Virginius was actually Cuban-owned and had been illegitimately licensed at the New York customshouse.  Given this “out” Grant allowed the issue to die though Spain later paid indemnities to American and a few British families of the victims.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  10-11 NOV 25 

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Howarth, Stephen.  To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy  1775-1991.  New York, NY: Random House, 1991, pp. 222-23.

Love, Robert W.  History of the US Navy, Vol 1  1775-1941.  Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, pp. 334-37.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1991, p. 94.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The Cuban civil war had broken out in 1868, and from the outset, US sentiments favored the Cubans.  Most of the filibustering (gun-running) was, in truth, being conducted by Americans.  President Grant asked Mr. Fish to formally recognize the rebels in 1869, in hopes of forcing the issue of Cuban independence with Spain.  But after it was discovered how very far the material readiness of our Navy had deteriorated since the Civil War, Congress had to revisit our forceful stance.

The Virginius affair stirred our Navy to conduct exercises off Key West two years later in 1875.  Five frigates, six monitors, and 20-odd smaller craft took part.  The event turned into an embarrassment as these few vessels were widely thought to be about the only seaworthy ones left in our Navy, and none could manage more than 4 ½ knots.  One newspaper pathetically complained, “They belong to a class of ships which other governments have sold or are selling for firewood.”  Indeed, it had taken only a decade for our Navy to slip from a position of world leader and innovator during the Civil War to that of a distant “also-ran.”

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                               THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR (cont.)

Watching the British advance, Villeneuve ordered his fleet into a traditional line-ahead (historians suspect a lack-luster execution was made in spite of Villeneuve’s suspicion that Nelson might break his line).  The vacillating Villeneuve then made a last-minute attempt to reverse course back to Cadiz, turning his line to the north, still in the lee of the English.  This deteriorated the French line into an arc, concave to Nelson’s approach.  In a masterful tactical stroke, Nelson now directed his 11-ship column against the center of the French line while Collingwood led his 16 toward the windward end.  The nine men-o-war of the French van, to the leeward, were thus held out of the action by the wind.  At 1135 Nelson hoisted the immortal signal to his men, “England expects every that every man will do his duty,” followed around noon with his last, “Engage the enemy more closely.”  Moments later HMS ROYAL SOVEREIGN, 100, came within range, and FOUGUEUX’s, 74, broadside opened the battle.

ROYAL SOVEREIGN pierced the enemy line between SANTA ANA, 112, and FOUGUEUX, raking both with double-shotted broadsides, then fell upon the heavier SANTA ANA.  Collingwood’s division intentionally cut out the last 17 enemy ships to his 16, banking on superior British gun accuracy and a 2:1 greater rate of fire.  Over the next two hours of heated battle his confidence proved meritorious.

Meanwhile, Nelson kept his column charging headforemost against the full weight of the Franco-Spanish broadside.  Aboard VICTORY Nelson’s officers pleaded with him to cover his uniform and medals with a coat, making him less a target.  He dissented however, owning that his officers and men would be greatly encouraged to see him plainly.  VICTORY forced the center of the enemy line between Villeneuve’s flagship BUCENTAURE, 80, and REDOUTABLE, 74.  She was followed closely by HMS TRÉMÉRAIRE, 98, whose raking broadside left 200 dead aboard REDOUTABLE.  VICTORY fell in with REDOUTABLE and BUCENTAURE, and in the height of the ensuing carnage, a sharpshooter in REDOUTABLE’s fighting tops recognized Nelson, striking him with a musket ball that tore through his right lung and lodged in his spine.  He was carried below where he lingered several hours, long enough to learn of the total English Victory.

By robbing Napoleon of his fleet, Trafalgar completely thwarted the Corsican’s designs on England.  The success understandably propelled Nelson to immortality, while completely shaking the Admiralty’s confidence in the century-old Permanent Fighting Instructions.  As a result, Trafalgar is hailed today as the greatest victory in 500 years of Royal Navy history and the culminating battle of the Age of Sail.

Watch the POD for more “Today in Naval History”

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Rehabilitation Medicine

Bennett, Geoffrey.  Nelson the Commander.  New York, NY: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1972, pp. 85, 250-82.

Callo, Joseph F.  “Lasting Lessons of Trafalgar.”  Naval History, Vol 19 (5), October 2005, pp. 16-22.

Herman, Arthur.  To Rule the Waves:  How the British Navy Shaped the World.  New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2004, pp. 360-94.

Nicolson, Adam.  Seize the Fire:  Heroism, Duty, and the Battle of Trafalgar.  New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2005.

Potter, E.B.  Sea Power: A Naval History, 2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1981, pp. 79-80.

Ross, Steven T. European Diplomatic History 1789-1815:  France Against Europe.  Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger, 1981, pp. 247-48.

Whipple, A.B.C.  The Seafarers:  Fighting Sail. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1979, pp. 135-70.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The Battle of Cape Trafalgar serves to illustrate how minor a player was the American Navy during the Age of Sail.  Never did we possess a fleet of the size and scope of that of England, France, or Spain, and even our largest sail warship, PENNSYLVANIA, 120, was eclipsed by larger at Trafalgar.  The nearest we came to a “fleet” action occurred at the outset of the Revolutionary War, when an eight-ship squadron led by the 24-gun ALFRED (a converted merchantman) raided British shore stations in the Bahamas.

The post The Battle of Trafalgar (cont.) appeared first on Today in Naval History.

                                    THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR

It was the fifth year of Napoleon Bonaparte’s fifteen-year empire-building reign in France.  Having already conquered Belgium, the Low Countries, Spain, and much of Italy, Napoleon’s next target was England.  He planned a cross-channel invasion and by 1805 had assembled a 150,000-man army at Boulogne in Northern France.  Blocking his way was the impenetrable “wooden wall” of the Royal Navy, whose grip on the English Channel Napoleon hoped to weaken by stirring up trouble in the British West Indies.

In March of 1805, French ADM Pierre Villeneuve slipped past the British blockade of Toulon and proceeded with 14 ships of the line to Martinique.  As the French hoped, British ADM Lord Horatio Nelson followed, thus taking his fleet out of Continental waters.  But when one of Nelson’s supply ships accidentally stumbled onto the French fleet escaping back to Europe, the British discerned the ruse.  Thus, when Villeneuve scurried back across the Atlantic to support Napoleon’s Channel crossing, he was met by ADM Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, Spain, and was forced to turn south to Vigo.  Disheartened, Villeneuve abandoned the Channel operation on his own initiative and headed for the Mediterranean, landing on the way at Cadiz in southern Spain.  Nelson, who had pressed sail and recrossed the Atlantic, took up a position off Cadiz and waited.

Napoleon was furious and relieved Villeneuve!  Having been forewarned however, the French admiral put to sea on October 19^th, ahead of Napoleon’s message, with a combined French/Spanish fleet numbering 33 of the line.  This was the opportunity for which Nelson had long waited.  Though he could muster only 26 of the line, he put his faith in superior English gunnery and set off in pursuit.  By daylight on this day off Cape Trafalgar, Spain, the two fleets closed to within nine miles.

The Royal Navy of this day inviolately operated according to the “Permanent Fighting Instructions” that prescribed, without exception, how fleet commanders were to deploy their forces in battle.  These Instructions were considered by the Admiralty as the surest means to victory, and captains who had deviated from them in the past had been court-martialed and executed.  The Instructions required a “line-ahead” attack, cruising broadside-to-broadside with the enemy’s line.  In actuality, this tactic usually served to bring opposing fleets to a sort of parity, ordaining that many engagements of this era ended as draws.  Nelson, to his credit, appreciated the flaws of these Permanent Fighting Instructions and ordered his ships into two parallel columns that approached the French line perpendicularly, head-on.  Nelson’s bows were vulnerable to French broadsides during the critical early moments of their approach.  Regardless, Nelson led the northern column in HMS VICTORY, 100, while VADM Cuthbert Collingwood led the other in HMS ROYAL SOVEREIGN, 100. 

Continued tomorrow…

Bennett, Geoffrey.  Nelson the Commander.  New York, NY: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1972, pp. 209-59.

Callo, Joseph F.  “Lasting Lessons of Trafalgar.”  Naval History, Vol 19 (5), October 2005, pp. 16-22.

Herman, Arthur.  To Rule the Waves:  How the British Navy Shaped the World.  New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2004, pp. 360-94.

Nicolson, Adam.  Seize the Fire:  Heroism, Duty, and the Battle of Trafalgar.  New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2005.

Potter, E.B.  Sea Power: A Naval History,2^nd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1981, pp. 74-79.

Ross, Steven T.  European Diplomatic History 1789-1815:  France Against Europe.  Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger, 1981, pp. 244-48.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The modern term “line Navy” originates from the classic line-ahead formation.  Like a chain, the line-ahead formation is only as strong as its weakest warship.  Should an enemy break the line, a general melee would ensue, for which the outcome was unpredictable.  Thus, only the strongest and most powerful warships were granted a position in the line-ahead formation, with only the best crews manning them.  The “line” Navy was the “business end” of an 18^th century navy, separate and distinct from naval administration, that later became known as the “staff Navy.”

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                                    THE BURNING OF FALMOUTH

Royal Navy North American theater commander, VADM Samuel Graves, took a hardline against the rebellious activities of Patriots in New England’s coastal towns.  He ordered Royal Navy LT Henry Mowat in HMS CANCEAUX, 6, to, “lay waste, burn and destroy” the seaports of Marblehead, Salem, Newbury, Cape Ann, Portsmouth, Ipswich, Saco, and Falmouth—seaports that had been the sites of anti-British stirrings.  Mowat saw this as revenge for an embarrassment he suffered five months earlier when CANCEAUX had been forced to flee Falmouth (modern Portland, Maine) under threat of numerically superior rebel militia (see story of 9 May).  Falmouth became the first target for Mowat’s squadron comprised of CANCEAUX, HMS HALIFAX, 12, HMS SPITFIRE (bomb barge), HMS SYMMETRY, and the privateer CAT, 20.  From Falmouth’s outer harbor on 16 October, Mowat sent a LT ashore with word that in two hours Mowat would “execute a just punishment” against their town “guilty of the most unpardonable rebellion.”  Negotiations subsequently granted a delay if the townspeople would swear loyalty to King George III and surrender small arms and gun carriages.  No oath was forthcoming, and only a few small arms were handed over.  At 0900 on this day the deadline passed.

At 0940 Mowat ran up the Red Ensign to begin the bombardment.  For eight hours British ships hurled 3000 projectiles–solid shot, grape, shell, bombs, carcasses, and musket shot.  As evening fell, Royal Marines were sent ashore to torch what remained.  They encountered scant resistance.  The earlier pause had given many residents the chance to flee.  Only one citizen was killed and one wounded.  Falmouth’s 400 structures were laid utterly waste, leaving 1000 homeless as winter approached.  Fifteen small vessels in Falmouth harbor were burned or captured.  Mowat moved next to Boothbay but had to call off that attack as the decks of his ships proved too weak for the recoil of guns in a prolonged bombardment.  In the four months that followed, Graves similarly struck: Stonington, Connecticut; Bristol, Rhode Island; and on 1 January 1776, Norfolk, Virginia.

 International condemnation ensued as the Continental Congress authorized, on 30 October, the purchase of two additional warships.  The French Foreign Minister proclaimed, “I can hardly believe this absurd and barbaric procedure on the part of an enlightened and civilized nation.”  Even the British home office was alarmed at the brutality unleashed on those who were still British citizens.  VADM Graves was relieved two months later, in part from the backlash over this raid.  Mowat, too, was repeatedly passed over for promotion.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  21-22 OCT 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Leamon. James S.  Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine.  Amherst, MA: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1993, pp. 70-74.

“Letter from Rev. Jacob Bailey.” IN: Clark, William Bell, (ed.), Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Naval Documents of the American Revolution Vol 2  1775.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1966, p. 500.

“Master’s Log of H.M. Armed Vessel CANCEAUX.” IN: Clark, William Bell, (ed.), Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Naval Documents of the American Revolution Vol 2  1775.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1966, pp. 501-02.

“Narrative of Daniel Tucker of Falmouth.” IN: Clark, William Bell, (ed.), Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Naval Documents of the American Revolution Vol 2  1775.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1966, pp. 500-01.

Sweetman, Jack.  American Naval History:  An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 3^rd ed.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2002, p. 1.

“Vice Admiral Samuel Graves to Lieutenant Henry Mowat, H.M. Armed Vessel, CANCEAUX.”  IN: Clark, William Bell, (ed.), Department of the Navy, Naval History Division.  Naval Documents of the American Revolution Vol 2  1775.  Washington, DC: GPO, 1966, pp. 324-26.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  “Carcasses” are hollow balls filled with flammable material and holed so the firing from a howitzer would ignite the incendiary.  Upon impact the projectile shatters, spreading the flames.

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                                                    MATANZAS

Spain gained a foothold in the Caribbean in the 1490s after her sponsorship of Christopher Columbus’ expeditions.  By the 16^th century she had effectively cornered the profitable Caribbean spice and sugar trade.  Spain’s Caribbean bases also became transit points for precious metal shipments from South America and the Pacific.  The lure of these riches attracted English and French privateers such that by the mid-1500s the Spanish Main fell victim to active marauding.  Concurrent religious turmoil in France between Catholics and Protestant Huguenots encouraged Huguenot leader Jean Ribault to seek colonial opportunities in the New World.  Thus in 1565 French and Spanish expeditions simultaneously descended on Spanish Florida, the Huguenots establishing Fort Caroline near modern Jacksonville, and the Spanish founding St. Augustine 30 miles to the south as a base against piracy.  A clash between the Catholic Spanish, who claimed title to Florida, and the Huguenots was inevitable.

The French took the initiative, sallying in mid-September to attack Pedro Menéndez de Avilés at St. Augustine.  But an untimely hurricane scattered Ribault’s fleet and drove it ashore along the Florida coast to the south.  Meanwhile Menéndez marched overland to successfully capture Fort Caroline.

To the south, 500 of Ribault’s shipwrecked Huguenots collected themselves in two large groups for a march up the coast.  The lead group was halted on September 29^th by an impassable coastal inlet 14 miles south of St. Augustine.  That same day 70 of Menéndez’ men reached the north side of this same inlet.  Menéndez now tricked the French into believing they were outnumbered and convinced them to surrender to Spanish benevolence.  Throughout this day Menéndez ferried the Huguenots, ten at a time, across the inlet.  As each ten arrived they were fed, then led out of sight behind the dunes.  Here they were bound and put to the sword.  All but 15 of the 126 Huguenots of this first group were thus dispatched.

Twelve days later the second group of 350 Frenchmen reached the inlet.  This time Ribault himself negotiated with Menéndez, also agreeing to surrender.  Using the same modus operandi the Spanish ferried the Frenchmen across, slaughtering 134 before their scheme was discovered.  The remaining Huguenots fled, most were later rounded up and imprisoned in Cuba.

The Spanish later built a small guardpost at this inlet, Fort Matanzas, the Spanish word for “slaughters.”  Spain held Florida almost continuously until 1819, when our own nation’s need for a base from which to counter the British in the Caribbean led the United States to purchase Florida.

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  6 OCT 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

De Quesada, Alejandro M.  A History of Florida Forts: Florida’s Lonely Outposts, Cheltenham, England: History Press, 2006, p. 43.

Site visit.  Fort Matanzas National Monument, St. Augustine, Florida, July 1997.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The Matanzas Inlet, into which drains the Matanzas River, represents a “backdoor” access point to St. Augustine.  Hence, the small wooden guardpost built by the Spanish to provide an early warning against a British or French attack.  This outpost was re-constructed of stone in the 1740s and stood (in marked disrepair) until 1924, when it was declared a US National Monument.  It has since been rebuilt by the National Park Service to its 1740s design and can be visited today, the Fort Matanzas National Monument, on Route A1A south of St. Augustine.

          The National Park Service was created in 1916.  Prior to that, the Antiquities Act of 1906, enacted during Theodore Roosevelt’s administration, gave Presidents executive power to designate National Monuments of historic or natural significance.

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                                WORLD WAR I AT OUR DOORSTEP

The bright sun and calm seas off Delaware’s coast this morning belied the sinister intent with which U-151 cruised the surface.  Germany and the US had been at war for a year, and U-151 had entered US waters with orders to lay mines in major American roadsteads.  On May 22^nd she had surfaced in the Chesapeake Bay and laid over 50 floating mines at its entrance.  While working on deck to do so, her crewmen had watched the lights of Virginia Beach and had listened to weather forecasts, sports news, and stock quotes from an Arlington radio station.  She then coursed north to the Delaware Bay, destroying the freighters SS Hattie Dunn, Hauppage, and Edna along the way.  More mines were laid inside Cape May, after which U-151 then shaped a course for New York City.  There the sub had dragged a cutting bar back and forth across the entrance to the harbor, severing two transatlantic telephone cables.

This day found U-151 prowling for unwary freighters off our coast.  Commercial ships of sail still operated in 1918, and a sail on the horizon turned out to be the merchant schooner Isabel B. Wiley, outbound from Philadelphia.  A shot across her bows halted the surprised schooner, but as her crew was coming to grips with a German submarine in US waters, another form appeared on the horizon.  U-151’s skipper, Korvettenkapitän Henrich von Nostitz und Jänckendorf, instructed Wiley to heave to and sped off after the steamer Winneconne.  The unarmed steamer’s crew had heard rumors of a U-boat in the area and once halted, accepted a prize crew.  Winneconne was conned back to Wiley, who had, curiously, stood by dutifully into the wind.  Both ships were destroyed with TNT.

U-151 left US waters in July having avoided the US Navy.  Her first such contact occurred on her return to Germany when she spotted a familiar silhouette, the former Norddeutsche Lloyd liner Kronprinz Wilhelm, then serving the US Navy as the troop transport USS VON STEUBEN (SP-3017).  A torpedo attack missed.

None of the seven German U-boats that operated off the American coast from May through October 1918 were originally built to be combatants.  Rather they were designed as submersible blockade runners, a novel innovation of the German Merchant Marine.  They smuggled sorely needed supplies from America to Germany past the British blockade.  U-151 had started her career as the merchant sub SS Oldendorf.  But after the US entered WWI and the Kaiser’s ships were no longer welcome in US ports, the German Merchant Marine converted the “U-cruisers” for military use.  The seven are credited with sinking 44 American freighters totaling 110,000 tons.  And a mine, probably sown by U-156, sank the only US Navy capital ship to be lost in WWI, the armored cruiser USS SAN DIEGO (ACR-6).

Watch for more “Today in Naval History”  6 JUN 25

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Harding, Stephen.  Great Liners at War.  Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1997, p. 45.

Scheck, William.  “Under the British Blockade:  The Cruise of the Deutschland,”  Sea Classics, Vol 28 (9), September 1995, pp. 58-63, 67-69.

Tarrant, V.E.  The U-Boat Offensive 1914-1945.  Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1989, pp. 70-71.

Thomas, Lowell.  Raiders of the Deep.  New York, NY: Award Books, 1964, pp. 254-93.

van der Vat, Dan.  Stealth at Sea:  The History of the Submarine.  New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1994, pp. 105-06, 119.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:  The story of Germany’s unarmed merchant subs is an interesting twist of naval history.  WWI occurred at the dawn of the age of submarines, and this was only one of several novel German experiments into methods of U-boat deployment.  The most famous of these merchant subs was SS Deutschland, who made two successful cargo voyages between the US and Germany in 1916-17.  When sailing as unarmed merchantmen these “U-cruisers” were not commissioned into the Kaiser’s Imperial Navy and of course flew the German Tricolor (black, white and red vertical bars) rather than the Kaiser’s Eagle war ensign.

The fact that the Germans used submarines to mine the Chesapeake, Delaware, and New York waterways in both WWI and WWII was not widely publicized.  The fact that several American ships were destroyed by these mines continues to be poorly appreciated today.

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