The Gunboat Navy
28 FEBRUARY 1803
THE GUNBOAT NAVY
“We are sacrificing everything to navigation and a Navy,” was candidate Thomas Jefferson’s slogan in the presidential election campaign of 1799-1800. Jefferson was an agrarian Southerner, distrustful of New England merchants and skeptical of our military establishment. Jefferson thought Europe would be threatened by a strong American navy, and a war with England or France might result. He encouraged Americans to abandon maritime pursuits, “What a glorious exchange would it be could we persuade our navigating fellow citizens to embark their capital in the internal commerce of our country, exclude foreigners from that, and let them take carrying trade in exchange: abolish the diplomatic establishments and never suffer an armed vessel of a nation to enter our ports.” His pro-Navy opponent, the incumbent, John Adams, had been raised in maritime Massachusetts.
Jefferson’s inaugural address emphasized his domestic focus on peace, economy in government, and state’s rights. Jefferson then proceeded to dismantle our Navy–in his first year selling or scrapping all but 13 warships (seven of these he mothballed into “ordinary”). Work was halted on all ships-of-the-line then under construction. He canceled improvements to yards and shore facilities, cut the Navy’s payroll, capped personnel at 3000 and abolished the middle officer grade of Master Commandant.
Jefferson’s new naval vision was purely defensive. Blue-water ops were passé as a bargain-priced fleet of small sail gunboats–generally 70-foot two-masted sloops or schooners, manned by 20 sailors, each mounting one or two 32-pounders, would patrol our harbors and coast. The first of these non-threatening craft was authorized by Congress on this date. Valuable high-grade seasoned oak timber that had been intended for ships-of-the-line was diverted into these little boats, who by 1807, numbered 176.
The gunboats proved almost worthless. They were impotent in protecting our maritime commerce or for backing American foreign policy. Their instability allowed blue-water sailing only with the guns stowed. Those that did reach the Mediterranean during the Barbary Wars arrived too late to be a factor. European experience had already demonstrated the futility of passive coastal defense against a determined invader, in truth, even a mass of these gunboats would have been no match for a single British warship. Moreover, Jefferson’s feared war with England did come a decade later, hatched not out of the threat we posed, but out of our debility in defending our commerce. In that War of 1812, the gunboats contributed neither to defending our shores nor to breaking the British blockade of our eastern seaboard.
Watch for more “Today in Naval History” 4 MAR 22
CAPT James Bloom, Ret.
Love, Robert W., Jr. History of the U.S. Navy, Vol 1, 1775-1941. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, pp. 72-75, 88-89.
Potter, E.B. and Chester W. Nimitz. Sea Power: A Naval History. Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960, pp. 204-05.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: “In ordinary” is an old term describing what we today call “in reserve.” Ships placed “in ordinary” had their running rigging stripped and their armament stowed. They were manned only with a skeleton crew necessary for caretaking. The term comes from the old English use of the word “ordinary” to mean an inn or tavern where temporary lodging was available. The term also gave rise to the “ordinary seaman,” a sailor with limited experience, only qualified to stand duty on ships “in ordinary,” as opposed to the “able seaman” qualified to serve sea-going duty.
